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TAX AVOIDANCE HAS BEEN A PROBLEM for governments since taxes were first 
introduced. Thirteenth century English property taxes were avoided by tax-
payers moving their assets outside the sherifP s jurisdiction. 1 Even more con-
niving were the citizens of 17th century England who avoided the Window 
Tax2 by covering their windows before the tax collector's visit. 3 
Combating tax avoidance in the modern world is no less difficult. 
In both Canada and Australia the relevant governments have found 
their initial legislative attempts to combat tax avoidance to be ineffective. 
In both cases this was largely due to the courts using an excessively literal 
interpretation of the respective tax legislation,4 rather than a purpose 
1. Lerunann and Coleman, Taxation Law in Australia, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1994) at 1.8. 
2. Under this tax the extent of a householder's wealth was measured by the number of windows in 
his or her house. This is not the only example of a tax based upon a taxpayer's consumption of 
luxury items. Other examples of such English taxes include: hat tax (1748-1811), glove tax 
(1785-1794), almanac tax (1711-1834), dice duty (1711-1862), hair powder tax (1786-1869), 
perfume tax (1786-1800) and wallpaper tax (1712-1836). See further Ben Schott, Schott's OriBinal 
Miscellany (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002) at 10. 
3. Woellner et al., 2004Australian Taxation Law, 14th ed. (Sydney: CCH Australia, 2004) at para. 
1-080 [Woellner]. 
4. In Australia this was underthelead ofBarwlck c.J. See e.g. Mullens v. FCT(1976), 135 C.L.R. 290, 6 
A.T.R. 504 [Mullens cited to C.L.R.]; Patcorp Investments Ltd. v. FCT(1976),.140 C.L.R. 247, 6 A.T.R. 
420 [Patcorp cited to CL.R.]; Slutzkin v. FCT(1977), 140 CL.R. 314, 7 A.T.R. 166 [5111tzkin cited to 
C.L.R.]; CridJand v. FCT(1977), 140 C.L.R. 330,77 A.T.C. 4538 [eridland cited to e.L.R.]; Fa v. 
Westraders Pty Ltd., [1979-80] 144 C.L.R. 55, (1980) 80 A.T.e. 4357 at 4358 (H.CA.) [Westraders 
cited to A.T.C].In Canada the leading case supporting this approach, known as the "legal rights" 
approach, is SheJI CAnada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622, 4 e.T.e. 313,99 D.T.e. 5669 (ShelJ 
Canada cited to S.CR.]. It will be seen that in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. The Queen, [2002] 3 Ee. 170; 
[2002] 2 C.T.C 197,2001 FCA 398 [Canadian PacifiC cited to Ee.], the courts applied the legal rights 
approach, espoused in Shell Canada, to Significantly (and incorrectly in the author' s view) read down 
the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule ('GAAR'). See also Lisa Philipps, "The Supreme Court of 
Canada's Tax Jurisprudence: What's Wrong with the Rule of Law" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 120 at 
142-144; David G. Duff, "Weak-Currency BorrOwings and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in 
Canada: From Shell Canada to Canadian Pacific" (2001) I.B.ED. 233 [Duff, "Weak-Currency"J; 
Brian ]. Arnold, "The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule" (2004) 52(2) 
Can. Tax. J. 488 at 504-511 [Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance"]. 
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test,5 and adopting an approach that legitimized arrangements that were 
structured to minimize tax by taking advantage of loopholes in the relevant 
legislation.6 In time each country concluded that the respective general 
avoidance provisions 7 were of limited application and ineffective8 to com-
bat the sophisticated tax avoidance schemes promoted by tax advisers.9 In 
5. In Canada the impetus for the introduction of the GAAR was the Supreme Court of Canada's 
rejection of the business purpose test in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.e.R. 536, 
e.T.e. 294, 84 D.T.C 6305 [Stub art cited to S.e.R.]. Under the legal rights test, statutory provi-
sions are given their "plain" or "literal" meaning, rather than a purposive interpretation, and the 
"legal effect" of a transaction, rather than its commercial or economic substance, prevails. See 
Shell Canada, ibid. at paras. 39-40, 45. Compare Arnold & Wilson, "The General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule-Part 1" (1988) 36 Can. Tax. J. 829 [Arnold & Wilson, "Part 1 "]; Arnold, "Reflections on the 
Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation and Tax Avoidance" (2001) 49(1) Can. Tax. ]. 1; 
Ward & Pagone, "The Canadian Experience with a General Anti-Avoidance Rule ('GAAR')" 
World Tax Conference 2002, 22-24 May 2002, London at 1-4; Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance", ibid. at 
488 and 492. See also David A. Ward & Maurice e. Cullity, "Abuse of Rights and the Business 
Purpose Test" (1981) 29 Can. Tax. ]. 451 and Ward et a/., "The Business Purpose Test and Abuse 
of Rights" (1985) Br. Tax. Rev. 68. On the general use of this statutory interpretation principle in 
Australia, see Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd. No.2 v. IRC (NZ) (1976), 76 A.T.e. 6001 at 6006-6007,6 A.T.R. 
744 (P.e.) [Europa No.2 cited to A.T.C]; FIT v. South Australian Battery Makers (1978), 140 CL.R. 
645 at 658, 660. Note in regard to the former decision that while it was a decision of the Privy 
Council, Barwick CJ. was again the 'author' of the majority judgment. 
6. Two key doctrines that made the original anti-avoidance provision in Australia, Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth.), s. 260 ('I114A'), ineffective were the choice principle and the 
antecedent transactions test. Under the choice principle, that the transaction was entered into 
deliberately to obtain a tax benefit did not prevent a taxpayer taking advantage of these 'exempt-
ing' doctrines. See Cridfand, supra note 4 at 339-340. Under the antecedent transactions test there 
must be a change to an existing arrangement before s. 260 will apply. See Europa No.2, ibid. at 
475; Mullens, supra note 4 at 294; Cridland, supra note 4 at 339-340; Gulland, Watson and Pincus v. 
FCT (1985), 85 A.T.e. 4765, 17 A.T.R. 1, (1985-86) 160 e.L.R. 55 at 73 and 111 [Gulland cited to 
e.L.R.]; FCT v. Buntino (1989),89 A.T.e. 4358 at 4363 (ECA.) [Bunting]; Rippon v. FCT(1992), 23 
A.T.R. 209, 92 A.T.e. 4186 at 4191-4192 CF.C.A.) [Rippon cited to A.T.e.]. Under this doctrine, s. 
260 will not apply where there has been no alteration of a pre-existing source of income, but 
rather a tax effective structuring of a new source of income. The Canadian courts had also adopt-
ed a doctrine not unlike the choice principle. Thus in Shell Canada, ibid. at para. 45 McLachlin J. 
stated that "absent a specific provision to the contrary, it is not the court's role to prevent taxpay-
ers from relying on the sophisticated structure of their transactions, arranged in such a way that 
that the particular provisions of the Act are met, on the basis that it would have been ineqUitable 
to those taxpayers who have not chosen to structure their transactions that way. Unless the Act 
provides otherwise, a taxpayer is entitled to be taxed based on what it actually did, not based on 
what it could have done, and certainly not based on what a less sophisticated taxpayer might have 
done." In turn, one of the transactions in Canadian Pacific, supra note 4, namely, the New Zealand 
weak currency transaction that pre-dated the introduction of the Canadian GAAR, was not chal-
lenged on appeal because the reasoning in Shell Canada, ibid. validated the arrangement: See 
Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 12. 
7. In the case of Canada, the relevant provision was Income Tax Act, R.S.e. 1985, c.1 ('ITA'). The 
original version of s. 24 5( 1) applied where, for example, an expense was "incurred in respect of a 
transaction or operation that, if allowed, would unduly or artificially reduce" the taxpayer's 
income. In the case of Australia, the relevant provision was s. 260 of the I1AA. 
8. Canada, Department of Finance, The White Paper: Tax Reform 1987 (Ottawa, Department of 
Finance, 18 June 1987) at 70 [Department of Finance, White Paper]. Regarding Australia, see FCT 
v. Peabody (1993),25 A.T.R. 32,93 A.T.e. 4104 at 4110 (EC.A.) [Peabody 2 cited to A.T.e.]; John v. 
FCT(1989), 89 A.T.e. 4101 at 4108 (F.e.A.) [John]; Davis v. FCT(1989), 86 A.L.R. 195,89 A.T.e. 
4377 at 4399 (F.e.A.) [Davis]; Case WS8 (1989),89 A.T.e. 524 at 533 (A.A.T.) [Case WS8]. 
9. Department of Finance, White Paper, ibid. at 211. Re Australia, see Grbich, "Problems of Tax 
Avoidance in Australia" in J.G. Head, ed., Tax Issues of the 1980s (Sydney: Australian Tax Research 
Foundation, 1983) at 416 and 424-426; Woellner, supra note 3 at para. 1-090. Unfortunately, in 
recent years this practice of the 1970s and 1980s has been resurrected. The government is also 
very concerned as to the increase in mass marketed tax schemes in recent years: Australian Tax 
Office, Annuaf Report 2002-2003. 
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Canada, it was determined that the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 ('ITA'), sec-
tion 245(1) would be repealed and replaced with a general anti-avoidance 
rule ('GAAR') contained in a new section 245 ITA.IO The Australian govern-
ment similarly decided to replace the Income Tax Assessment Act, Cth. 1936 
('ITAA'), section 260 with a new general anti-avoidance measure, Part IVA 
ITAA, II and purportedly buried the doctrines that had rendered section 260 
largely ineffective. 12 Both GAARs were designed to "prevent artificial tax 
avoidance arrangements." 13 In Canada, this was to be facilitated by introduc-
ing a 'business purpose' test and a 'step transaction' approach into the ITA. 14 
'While the current Canadian GAAR applies to transactions entered 
into on or after 13 September 1988, nearly a decade passed before it was 
first considered by the courts in McNichol v. The Qpeen. 15 Since that case the 
legislation has had only limited judicial consideration and was only consid-
ered by the Court of Appeal for the first time in 2001, in OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. 
The Queen. 16 To date there has been no consideration of the prOvisions by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 17 Equally, there has not been a wealth of judicial 
discussion of Part IVA of the ITAA in Australia. While Part IVA of the ITAA 
10. Introduced by s. 185 Income Tax Act 1988. Generally, the new s. 245 applies to transactions entered 
into or after 13 September 1988. Note the GAAR recently 'survived' a constitutional challenge 
in Kaulius et a1. v. The Queen (2003), D.T.e. 5644, 2003 FCA 371, leave to appeal to S.e.e. granted 
[Kaulius]. 
11. Part IVA generally applies to schemes entered into after 27 May 1981. See l1AA, supra note 6 at s. 
177D. Where the tax benefit is the incurring of a capital loss the scheme must have been entered 
into after 3:00 p.m. 29 April 1997. Where the tax benefit is the obtaining of a foreign tax credit 
the scheme must have been entered into after 4:00 p.m. 13 August 1998. Where the tax benefit 
arises from avoiding withholding tax, this must occur after 20 August 1996. 
12. See further Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4110; John, supra note 8 at 4108; Davis, supra note 8 at 4399; 
Case W58, supra note 8 at 533. 
13. See Department of Finance, White Paper, supra note 8 at 70. In Australia the Treasurer stated that 
Part IVA was introduced "to strike down blatant, artificial or contrived arrangements, but not 
cast unnecessary inhibitions on normal commercial transactions by which taxpayers legitimately 
take advantage of the opportunity available for the arrangement of their affairs": Austl., 
Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, (27 May 1981) at 2683-2684 
(Mr. Howard, Treasurer) [Second.R.eadinaSpeech]. 
14. See Department of Finance, White Paper, ibid. This latter point is highly relevant to the discussion 
below of one of the leading Canadian cases. See Canadian Pacific, supra note 4. 
15. [1997] 2 e.T.C. 2088, 97 D.T.C. 111 [McNicho~. There was an earlier decision of the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal. See Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd. v. .MN.R. (1995), 3 G.T.C. 4040, 1995 
GSTC 17 (CITI). See further Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd. v. MNR, [2000] G.T.C. 4070, [2000] 3 EC. 
418 [Michelin 2]. 
16. [2002] 2 Ee. 288, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 82,2001 D.T.C. 5471,2001 FCA 260 [OSFq, aff'g [1999] 3 
C.T.e. 2649, 99 D.T.e. 1044 (T.c.c.). The Court of Appeal has only considered the provisions on 
few occasions since. See The Queen Y. Donahue Forest Products Inc., 2002 FCA 422 [Donahue]; Jabin 
Investments Ltd. v. The Queen (2002), 300 N.R. 142,2002 FCA 520 [Jabin]; Canadian Pacific, supra 
note 4; SIB Holdinas Ltd. v. The Queen, [2003] 3 EC. 626, 2002 FCA 386 [SIB]; Water's Edae Villaae 
btates (phase II) v. The Queen, [2003] 2 Ee. 25, [2002] 4 c.T.c. 1, 2002 FeA 291 [Water's Edne]; 
Kauiius, supra note 10; ImperialOilLtd. v. The Queen, [2004] D.T.C. 6044,2004 FCA 36 [Imperial 
Oi~; Canada Trustco Mortaane Company v. The Queen, [2004] D.T.e. 6119, [2004] 2 e.T.C. 276,2004 
FCA 67; leave to appeal to S.e.c. granted [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 157 (Q.L.) [Canada Trustco]. 
17. On 24 June 2004 leave was granted to appeal the decision in Canada Trustco, ibid. This will be the 
first Supreme Court decision on the GAAR. 
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governs tax avoidance schemes entered into, or furthered, after 27 May 
1981, a decade passed between this date and the first judiciaP8 consideration 
of the substantive operation of Part IV A of the lTAA, found in Peabody v. 
Fer 19 While there has been a recent flurry of cases20 considering Part IVA of 
the lTAA, to a large extent a dearth of authority on the scope and meaning of 
these provisions continues.21 
This article compares and contrasts the Canadian and Australian 
GAARs. Through the evaluation of each regime the article seeks to identify 
which model is most effective. It will be seen that both regimes have some 
features that are preferable to the other and thus both GAARs might be 
improved by incorporating aspects of the other anti-avoidance model. 22 
II. Legislative Framework 
A. CANADIAN GAAR 
This article analyzes each of the relevant elements of the Canadian GAAR: 
(i) "avoidance transaction"; (ii) "tax benefit"; (iii) primary "purpose" of 
obtaining the tax benefit; and (iv) "misuse" of provision(s) and/or "abuse" of 
the Act. Each is then evaluated in light of the comparable Australian ele-
ment. Before this is undertaken a brief introduction of the two legislative 
regimes is necessary. 
The key charging provision under the Canadian GAAR is section 
245(2) ITA: 
Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences to a per-
son shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a 
tax benefit that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, from 
that transaction or from a series of transactions that includes that transaction. 
18. Though there had been earlier decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, most notably, 
Case W58, supra note 8. 
19. (1992),92 A.T.e. 4585 (Ee.A.) [Peabody 1]. 
20. See, for example, Egan v. FCJ, (2001) A.T.e. 2185 (A.A.T.) [Egan]; FCJ v. Consolidated Press Holdings 
Ltd. (2001), A.T.e. 4343 (H.e.A.) [Consolidated Press]; FeTv. Metal Manufacturers (2001), A.T.e. 
4152 (Ee.A.) [Metal Manufacturers]; Eastern Nitrogen v. FCJ(2001), A.T.e. 4164 (Ee.A.) [Eastern 
Nitrogen]; Vincent v. FCT (2002), A.T.e. 4742 (Ee.A.) [Vincent]; Mochkin v. FCT, (2002) A.T.e. 4465 
[Mochkin 1]; Mochkin v. FCJ, (2003) A.T.e. 4272 (Ee.A.) [Mochkin 2]; Sleight v. FCT, [2003] 53 
A.T.R. 667, [2003] Ee.A. 896 [Sleight cited to A.T.R.]; Puzey v. FCT, [2003] EC.A.Ee. 197 [Puzey]; 
FeT v. MacArthur, [2003] Ee.A. 903 [MacArthur]; Hart v. FCJ (2002), A.T.e. 4608 (Ee.A.) [Hart 2], 
rev'd [2004] H.e.A. 26 [Hart 3]. 
21. Until recently there were only three substantive considerations of Part IVA J1AA. See Peabody 2, 
supra note 8 and Peabody 1, supra note 19 and on further appeal (1994), 94 A.T.C. 4663 (H.e.A.) 
[Peabody 3]; Osborne v. FCT(1995), 95 A.T.e. 4323 (Ee.A.) [Osborne]; Spotless Services Ltd. v. FeT 
(1993),93 A.T.e. 4397 (EC.A.) [Spotless 1], aff'd (1995), 95 A.T.e. 4775 (FC.A.) [Spotless 2], 
rev'd (1996),96 A.T.e. 5201 (H.e.A.) [Spotless 3]. 
22. For example, it will be contended that the Canadian "step transaction" approach is less complicat-
ed than the Australian use of the notion of "scheme." Equally, though it is suggested that the role 
and scope of the Canadian exemption, detailed in s. 245(4) ITA, is unclear and the Australian 
exclusionary limb, contained in s. 177C(2)-(3) J1AA, is more specific in its scope. 
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"[T]ax consequences" is defined as "the amount of income, taxable 
income, or taxable income earned in Canada or, tax or other amount 
payable by, or refundable to the person under this Act, or any other amount 
that is relevant for the purposes of computing that amount" (section 245(1) 
ITA). An "avoidance transaction" is defined in section 245(3) ITA as any 
transaction: 
(a) that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, 
unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken 
or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit; 
or 
(b) that is part of a series of transactions, which series, but for this section, 
would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may 
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for 
bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit. 
A "transaction" is in turn defined as "an arrangement or event" (sec-
tion 245(1) ITA). A "series of transactions or events" is deemed under sec-
tion 248(10) ITA to "include any related transactions or events completed in 
contemplation of the series." A "tax benefit" is broadly defined in section 
245(1) ITA as "a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount 
payable under this Act or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount 
under this Act." 
Section 245 ITA also includes an "exception." Under section 245(4) 
ITA, section 245(2) ITA will not apply to a transaction where "it may reason-
ably be considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirect-
ly in a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the 
prOvisions of this Act, other than this section, read as a whole." 
B. AUSTRALIAN GAAR 
For Part IVA.l1AA to apply there must be a (i) "scheme" that prOvides (ii) the 
"relevant taxpayer" with a (iii) "tax benefit" and a (iv) person must have 
entered into the scheme for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling the rel-
evant taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit (section 177D).23 If all elements are sat-
isfied, Part IVA ITAA allows the Commissioner to cancel the whole or part of 
the tax benefit stemming from the subject scheme (section 177F). Part fVA 
also allows for reconstruction insofar as the Commissioner may make a fair 
and reasonable compensatory adjustment (sections 177F and 177G .l1AA). 
Scheme is defined in exceptionally broad terms in section 177A(1) 
lTAA: 
23. Part IVAlTAA also applies to dividend stripping schemes (s. 177E IlAA) and franking credit 
schemes (s. 177EA IlAA). See further these provisions for the prerequisites necessary for Part 
IVA to apply to these specific schemes. 
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(a) any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking, 
whether express or implied and whether or not enforceable, or intended 
to be enforceable by legal proceedings and; 
(b) any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct. 
This definition is extended by section 177 A(3) ITAA to include unilat-
eral schemes. It will be seen that the notion of "scheme" has heen subject to 
important judicial extrapolation.24 
The "relevant taxpayer" is the person who obtains the tax benefit 
stemming from the scheme (section 177D ITAA). Originally "tax benefit" 
was defined in terms of the non-inclusion of an amount that would or might 
reasonably be expected to be included in the taxpayer's income25 or the 
allowance of a deduction that would or might not have been expected to be 
allowable, but for the scheme (section 177C(1». As this definition was 
exhaustive in its terms, any other tax benefit, such as a rebate, credit or 
deferral, did not fall within the definition of tax benefit, and thus was not 
subject to Part IVA ITAA.26 The scope of section 177C(I) ITAA has been 
extended by subsequent amendments. The notion of a tax benefit now 
includes: 
. a capital loss that would or might not have been reasonably expected 
to be incurred but for a scheme entered into after 3 p.m. 29 April 1997; or 
. a foreign tax credit that would or might not have reasonably been 
expected to be allowable but for a scheme entered into after 4 p.m. 13 
August 1998. 
Section 177CA ITAA also includes in the notion of tax benefit an 
amount that the taxpayer would or might reasonably have been expected to 
be liable for in Withholding tax after 20 August 1996. 
A person must have entered into the scheme for the sole or dominant 
purpose of enabling the relevant taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit (sections 
177A(S) and 177D ITAA). In determining this matter, regard must be had to 
the factors listed in section 177D(b) lTAA: 
24. See, in particular, Peabody 3, supra note 21; See also Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 4805; Hart 2, supra 
note 20 at 4619,4626-7. 
25. The first limb of the s. I77C( 1) ITAA definition of tax benefit is now clarified by s. 177C( 4) J1AA. 
This prOvides that a tax benefit is made within s. 177C(1)(a) LTAA if instead of income being 
included in the taxpayer's assessable income, the taxpayer makes a discount capital gain. 
26. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4117. Note it is proposed to extend the definition of tax benefit so that it 
will apply generally to any reduction or deferral of tax, whether through the non-inclusion of 
income or allowance of a deduction, loss, rebate or credit. See Treasurer of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Press Release, No. 074, "The New Business Tax System: Stage 2 Response" (11 
November 1999), online: Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr!content/pressreleases/1999/074.asp>. To date such propos-
als have not been enacted. 
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(i) manner in which the scheme was entered into; 
(ii) form and substance of the scheme; 
(iii) time at which scheme entered into and the length of the period during 
which the scheme was carried out; 
(iv) result that would be achieved but for Part NAj 
(v) any change in financial position of the taxpayer as a result of the scheme; 
(vi) any change in financial position of any person who has a connection (Le. 
family or business) with the taxpayer as a result of the scheme; 
(vii) any other consequences for the relevant taxpayer or any other person 
referred to in sub-paragraph (vi); and 
(viii) the nature of any connection (Le. family or business) between the 
taxpayer and a person referred to in sub-paragraph (vi). 
The "exemption" under the Australian GAAR is found in an exclu-
sionary limb in the above-mentioned definition of "tax benefit." Section 
177C(2) ITAA excludes from the notion of tax benefit the non-inclusion of 
income, the allowance of a deduction, the incurring of a capital loss or 
allowance of a foreign tax credit that is "attributable to the making of an 
agreement, choice, declaration, election or selection, the giving of a notice 
or the exercise of an option" expressly prOvided for by the ITAA or Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997 ('ITAA 1997'). The section includes, however, an 
extra caveat that reqUires that the scheme was not entered into or carried 
out to create a circumstance or state of affairs "which is necessary to enable 
the declaration, agreement, election, selection, choice, notice or option to 
be made, given or exercised .... " 
III. Avoidance Transaction 
A. TRANSACTION OR SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS: CANADIAN GAAR 
To be an "avoidance transaction" within section 245(3) ITA, set out above, 
three elements must be satisfied: 
· there must be a "transaction" or a transaction that is "part of a 
series of transactions;" 
· that transaction or a series would, but for the GAAR, result in a 
"tax benefit"27; and 
· it cannot reasonably be considered that the transaction (or a 
transaction in the series) was undertaken or arranged primarily 
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit.28 
While all three elements are inextricably linked, the latter two are 
considered separately below. 
As to the first element, it will be apparent from the above introduc-
tion that there are two alternative reqUirements. The facts may constitute a 
27. lbis is known as the 'results test.' See OSFe, supra note 16 at para. 17. 
28. This is known as the 'purpose test.' See ibid. 
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single isolated "transaction" (section 24S(3)(a) ITA) or may be ('part of a 
series of transactions" (section 24S(3)(b) ITA). Moreover, either the isolated 
"transaction" (section 24S(3)(a) ITA) or the broader "series" (section 
24S(3)(b) ITA) may result in the tax benefit. The latter subparagraph pro-
vides an important extension to the notion of ('avoidance transaction." 
While sections 245(3) and 248(10) ITA have been identified by the courts as 
lacking clarity29 and, in particular, the reference to "the transaction" in sec-
tion 245(3)(b) ITA has been said to be ambiguous,3o ultimately the Canadian 
courts have resolved that under section 245(3)(b) ITA, it suffices if any part 
of the series of transactions has as its primary purpose the obtaining of the 
tax benefit. 31 Thus if the factual scenario involves, for example, four trans-
actions, each transaction in the series must be assessed to determine its 
underlying purpose.32 As long as the transactions are connected so as to be 
part of a series, as discussed below, it suffices if one transaction, one step, has 
the primary purpose of obtaining the tax benefit. 33 Once one transaction is 
found to have that purpose, all the other transactions that are part of the 
series are tainted with the illegitimate purpose.34 Even if all other transac-
tions in the series have a bona fide business or family purpose as their primary 
concern or the series as a whole has as its primary purpose a bona fide con-
cern, subsection 245(3) ITA will nevertheless be satisfied and each transac-
tion will be an avoidance transaction. This is deSigned to prevent taxpayers 
from inserting into a series of transactions with an overall business purpose 
a transaction that has no purpose other than tax. 35 This is known as the "step 
transaction" approach, noted above. 
Under a literal interpretation of subsection 24S(3)(b) ITA, the refer-
ence to '(the transaction", which is to be examined to identify the primary 
purpose, could refer to the particular step or transaction in which the tax-
payer actually participated, rather than examining each transaction that 
forms part of the series. Such an interpretation would, however, render sub-
section 245(3)(b) ITA meaningless36 because it would mean that if the partic-
ular transaction undertaken by the taxpayer was primarily for bona fide 
business or family reasons then, despite its connection to another transac-
tion in the series which had been entered into primarily for tax reasons, the 
29. Ibid. at para. 28. 
30. Ibid. at paras. 124-126. This ambiguity is discussed below. 
31. Ibid. at para. 45. 
32. Ibid. at paras. 124 and 126, quoting in support Department of Finance in its Technical Notes to Bill C-
139, Special Report No. 851, (CCH Canadian Ltd., 1988) at 315 [Technical Notes]; Brian j. Arnold, 
Chapter 7, Tax Avoidance and The Rule of Law (Amsterdam: I.B.F.D. Publications, 1997) at 232-233 
[Arnold. Tax AVOidance]. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. at paras. 124, 126. 
35. Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance", supra note 4 at 493. 
36. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 125. 
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taxpayer's transaction would not be an avoidance transaction.37 This would 
mean that subsection 24S(3)(b) ITA would have no function beyond subsec-
tion 24S(3)(a) ITA. Under this view, once it was ruled under subsection 
24S(3)(a) ITA that the transaction was not an avoidance transaction because 
of its legitimate purpose, the conclusion would be no different under sub-
section 24S(3)(b) ITA.38 Under this view the taxpayer's transaction would be 
assessed as a single transaction under both subsection 24S(3)(a) and (b) ITA 
"notwithstanding that paragraph (b) defines as an avoidance transaction 'any 
transaction' that is part of the series of transactions which produced the tax 
benefit and were arranged or undertaken primarily for that purpose."39 
For this reason the contrary approach taken in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. 
The Queen40 is clearly erroneous. This case involved a weak-currency bor-
rowing arrangement. 41 Briefly, the taxpayer borrowed funds in Australian 
dollars (at a comparative high interest rate), then conv-erted them into 
Canadian dollars (With a lower interest rate), the funds to be used in its 
Canadian operations. Repayments were made pursuant to forward con-
tracts that locked in the foreign exchange gains from an expected deprecia-
tion of the Australian dollar. Under Canadian tax laws, the taxpayer could 
obtain significant tax advantages through such weak-currency borrowings.42 
This case involved what authors have described as a "blatant tax avoid-
ance scheme"43 that had been "deSigned to obtain inflated interest deduc-
tions during the term of the loan and tax-preferred capital gains on 
repayment of the principal amount of the loan .... "44 Nevertheless, the 
Canadian courts held the GAAR did not apply to the arrangement;45 One of 
the key reasons was an erroneous understanding of the impact of subsection 
24S(3)(b) ITA. Bonner T.C.]. had held that, but for the tax benefits underly-
ing this arrangement, the taxpayer would have directly borrowed the sub-
ject funds in Canadian dollars.46 While it was also accepted that the 
borrowing and foreign exchange transactions constituted a series, Bonner 
T.e.]. held that because the series as a whole had the bonafide purpose of 




40. See e.n. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at 184-185. Note, s. 20.3 now specifically overrules this deci-
sion. For a fuller discussion of the case see Brian J. Arnold, "Canadian Federal Court of Appeal 
Refuses to Apply GAAR to Aussie/Yen Loan" (2002) 25 Tax Notes Int'1204 [Arnold, 
"AussielYen Loan"]. 
41. See also Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 234. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Brian J. Arnold, "Supreme Court of Canada Approves Blatant Tax-Avoidance Scheme" (1999) 19 
Tax. Notes Int'l. 1813 [Arnold, "Tax-Avoidance Scheme"]. 
44. Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 233. 
45. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4. 
46. Ibid. at para. 12. 
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apply, even though a transaction in the series was undertaken for tax rea-
sons.47 Bonner T.C.J. held that "[n]o transaction forming part of the series 
can be viewed as having been arranged for a purpose which differs from the 
overall purpose of the series."48 
On appeal, the Federal Court asserted that the extended definition of 
a transaction "cannot be interpreted to justify taking apart a transaction in 
order to isolate its business and tax purposes. The necessity to determine pri-
mary purpose implies that there is more than one purpose and that the trans-
action is to be considered as a whole."49 The Federal Court reiterated that 
the "words of the Act require consideration of a transaction in its entirety 
and it is not open to the Crown artificially to split off various aspects of it in 
order to create an avoidance transaction." In this case the overall purpose of 
borrowing was held to prevent the GAAR applying to the tax benefit 
arrangement despite the extended definition of transaction. so 
It is not entirely clear that the Federal Court in making these com-
ments was adopting the same approach as Bonner T.C.J. on this issue. It is 
arguable that Federal Court is merely saying "that one transaction within a 
series of transactions cannot be further divided into separate components 
for the purpose of finding one of those components an avoidance transac-
tion."51 However, from other parts of the judgment it seems that the Federal 
Court's reference to a "component" is to a "separate transaction" that is part 
of the broader series, rather than a part of a transaction. 52 Moreover, in light 
of the Federal Court's ultimate conclusion, that is, upholding Bonner 
T.C.J.'s finding on the point, it appears the Federal Court may be agreeing 
with his view that the "series" cannot be so separated into transactions when 
identifying the relevant primary purpose. 
If this is a correct interpretation of the Courts' findings in this case, as 
stated above, this view is erroneous. As Duff notes, this approach "disre-
gards both the text of Sec. 24S(3)(b), which addresses the purpose of each 
transaction comprising a series of transactions, and the legislature's express 
intent to introduce a 'step transaction' [approach]. ... "53 The extent of the 
lack of understanding of the legislation is highlighted by the Federal Court's 
comment that if the contrary view were adopted this would have the unin-
tended result that it would suffice if a "separate transaction" was "undertak-
47. Ibid. at para. 27. Thus while there was no business purpose for arranging to borrow Australian 
currency when Canadian currency was used in the "business, this did not mean that the GAAR 
applied because the overall series was based on a business purpose. Compare Ward & Pagone, 
supra note 5 at 55; Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance," supra note 4 at 494-495. 
48. Ibid. at para. 15. 
49. Ibid. at para. 24; Canadian Pacific 2, ibid. at 184. 
50. Ibid. at paras. 23 and 26; Canadian Pacific 2, ibid. at 184-185. 
51. Loyens Yo R., [2003] 3 C.T.C. 2381, 57 D.T.C. 355,2003 TCC 214 at para. 84 [Loyens cited to 
C.T.C.]. 
52. See Canadian Pacific 1, supra note 4 at para. 25; Canadian Pacific 2, supra note 4 at 184. 
53. Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 239. 
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en for purely tax purposes .... "54 As noted above, this was not unintended. 
This is the whole basis of subsection 245(3)(b) [fA. It suffices under subsec-
tion 245(3)(b) ITA that one transaction in the series has been undertaken for 
tax. reasons. 55 
Once this view of subsection 245(3) ITA is accepted, this analysis still 
requires a further understanding of what is a "series of transactions" and the 
degree of connection that is necessary for one transaction to be part of a 
series. In this regard there were three possible approaches to this matter. 
First, subsection 245(3) ITA could be seen as a legislative enactment of the 
doctrine of fiscal nullity and, in turn, the definition of "a series of transac-
tions or events" in subsection 248(10) ITA would be read down to accord 
with that doctrine. The doctrine of fiscal nullity, as developed by the English 
judiciary, renders an arrangement ineffective for tax purposes where there 
is a preordained composite transaction or series of transactions and inserted 
into this transaction(s) is a step(s) with no commercial or business purpose 
other than tax avoidance. 56 Under this common law doctrine, for two or 
more transactions to be seen as part of a series they must be pre-ordained to 
produce a final result. 57 Pre-ordained in this context means that when the 
first transaction in the series was implemented, it had been determined by a 
person(s) capable of implementing all subsequent transactions that each 
would occur.58 U[T]here must be no practical likelihood that the subsequent 
transaction or transactions will not take place."59 
Second, the relevance of the doctrine of fiscal nullity in interpreting 
"series" could be recognized, but the courts could acknowledge that subsec-
tion 248(10) ITA extends the notion beyond the common law doctrine of fis-
cal nullity. Under this view, subsection 248(10) ITA would include in the 
notion of a "series" "any related transactions or events completed in con-
templation of the series." There would be no need for each transaction to be 
pre-ordained as long as they were related within subsection 248(10) ITA.60 
Third, the Canadian judiciary could use the "mutual interdependence 
test" and the "end results test" used by some United States courts. Under the 
mutual interdependence test, "two or more transactions will constitute a 
series if the transactions are so interdependent that the legal relations ere at-
54. umadian Pacific 1, supra note 4 at para. 25; Canadian PacifIc 2, supra note 4 at 184. 
55. OSFC, supra note 16 at paras. 124 and 126. In regard to the application of this principle to the 
Canadian Pacific case, see Ward & Pagone, supra note 5 at 16 and Arnold, ''Anti-Avoidance,'' supra 
note 4 at495. 
56. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] A.C. 474 at 512,1 All E.R. 530,2 W.L.R. 226 [Furniis cited to A.C.]. See 
also Craven v. White, [1989] A.C. 398 at 459, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 3 W.L.R. 423 [Craven cited to 
A.C.]. 
57. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 24. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid at para. 36. 
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ed by one transaction would be meaningless without a completion of the 
series."61 Under the "end results test," otherwise separate transactions are 
"amalgamated as a single transaction when it appears that they were really 
component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken 
for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result."62 
The Canadian courts have been divided on which approach to adopt. 
The leading discussion of this issue is found in OSF[63. Briefly, the facts 
involved four. key transactions. First, the liqUidator of a company, Standard 
Company, caused the company to incorporate a subSidiary. Second, 
Standard Company formed a partnership (" STIL II") with the subSidiary. 
Standard Company had a 99% interest in the partnership, while the sub-
sidiary held a 1 % interest. Third, Standard Company transferred its mort-
gage portfolio to the partnership. In short this was designed to transfer 
Standard Company's loss to the partnership so that an arm's length purchas-
er could acquire an interest in the partnership and thereby accrue the tax 
loss for the latter's use. Fourth, the taxpayer, OSFCHo!dings Ltd., acquired an 
interest in the STIL II partnership. One of the taxpayer's contentions was 
that the fourth transaction "was an independent transaction and not part of 
a series with the Standard transactions. Therefore, the appellant's acquisi-
tion of the STIL II partnership interest should not be tainted by the Standard 
transactions. "64 
Rothstein J .A., with whom Stone J .A. concurred, adopted the second 
of the above detailed approaches. Rothstein J .A. concluded that, subject to 
subsection 248(10) ITA, subsection 24S(3)(b) ITA was intended to embody the 
doctrine of fiscal nullity. This was apparent from the government's references 
to the doctrine and the leading English case, Furniss v. Dawson, in the course of 
enacting the Canadian GAAR.65 In turn, Rothstein J .A. rejected the applica-
bility of the "mutual interdependence test" and the ((end results test/'66 
Rothstein J .A. then turned to consider the impact of subsection 
248(10) ITA. It was open to interpretation that subsection 248(10) ITA was 
"simply ... a statutory codification of the House of Lords definition of 'series 
of transactions'''67 under the doctrine of fiscal nullity and thus required pre-
61. Ibid. at para. 21. See also ibid. at para. 130; Brian J. Arnold & James R. Wilson, "The General Anti-
Avoidance Rule-Part 2" (1988) 36 Can. Tax. J. 1123 at 1162 [Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2"]. 
62. Ibid., citing John Tiley, "Series of Transactions" in 1988 Conference Report. Report of Pro ceedi nBs of 
the Fortieth Tax Conference Held November 28-30, 1988 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) 
at 8:3-8:4. See also OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 130. See also Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2", ibid. 
63. Supra note 16. 
64. Ibid. at para. 16. See also ibid. at para. 129. 
65. See especially ibid. at paras. 22-24, citing Michael Hiltz, "Section 245 of the Income Tax Act" in 
1988 Conference Report. Report ofProceedinBs of the Fortieth Tax Conference Held November 28-30, 
1988 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) at 7:7; David A. Dodge, "A New and More 
Coherent Approach to Tax Avoidance" (1988) 36 Can. Tax. J. 1 at 15. 
66. Ibid. at para. 24. 
67. lbid. at para. 28. 
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ordained transactions. Rothstein J.A. concluded, however, that subsection 
248(10) ITA provided a broader definition of a "series" and thus included in 
the notion transactions that would not fall within the House of Lord's test.68 
"Under this approach, an independent transaction would be deemed to be 
included in the series for the purposes of subsection 248(10) if it is related to 
the transactions in the common law series and if it is completed in contem-
plation of the common law series."69 "Whether the related transaction is 
completed in contemplation of the common law series requires an assess-
ment of whether the parties to the transaction knew of the common law 
series, such that it could be said that they took it into account when deciding 
to complete the transaction. If so, the transaction can be said to be complet-
ed in contemplation of the common law series."7o There was no need for it 
to be pre-ordained as under the common law.7! As subsection 248(10) is a 
"deeming" provision, not merely a definition section, Rothstein J .A. con-
cluded that its deeming function meant that it was extending the definition 
in this manner beyond the common law definition of series.72 Thus 
Rothstein J.A. concluded that subsection 248(10) requires three considera-
tions: "[F]irst, a series of transactions within the common law meaning; sec-
ond, a transaction related to that series; and third, the completion of the 
related transaction in contemplation of that series."73 
Rothstein J .A. found that while the first three transactions undertak-
en by Standard Company were pre-ordained within the common law test,74 
the fourth transaction undertaken by the taxpayer would not satisfy the test 
and thus would not be part of the series under Furniss v. Dawson.75 However, 
the fourth transaction, the taxpayer's acquisition of the STIL II partnership 
interest, was connected to the first three Standard Company transactions.76 
"Standard, in liquidation, and the [taxpayer], the parties to the acqUisition 
transaction, knew of the Standard series and took it into account when decid-
ing to complete the acquisition transaction. Therefore, the [taxpayer's] acqUi-
sition of its STIL II partnership interest was a transaction that was related to 
the Standard series and was completed in contemplation of that series."77 As 
the Tax Court Judge had found that the first three Standard Company trans-
68. Ibid. at para. 29. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Ibid. at para. 36. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid. at para. 33. Rothstein lA. also pointed to the fact that when s. 245 ITA was enacted a "grand-
father" provision was included in regard to s. 248(10) ITA: Ibid. at para. 32. See also Tiley, supra 
note 62 at 8:5. 
73. Ibid. at para. 35. 
74. Ibid. at para. 25. 
75. Ibid. at para. 26. 
76. Ibid. at para. 38. 
77. Ibid. 
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actions were undertaken primarily to obtain a tax benefit,78 that Court did 
not consider the primary purpose underlying the fourth transaction as it was 
in any case tainted by the avoidance transactions.79 On appeal, however, 
Rothstein J .A. also considered the purpose underlying the fourth transaction 
and found that it too was primarily to obtain a tax benefit.8o 
Letourneau J .A. concurred with Rothstein J .A.' s result, but did not 
agree with Rothstein J.A.'s approach to section 245 ITA. With respect to the 
current issue, Letourneau J .A. seemed to apply the doctrine of fiscal nullity. 
Thus he concluded, contrary to Rothstein J.A., that the fourth transaction, 
the sale of the partnership interest to the taxpayer, was part of the "pre-
ordained steps carried out by STC's liquidator."81 Letourneau J.A., howev-
er, also went on to apply both the "mutual interdependence" and the "end 
result" tests to the facts, concluding both would be satisfied.82 Strangely, 
there is no reference to subsection 248(10) ITA, nor any explanation as to 
why it was not considered. For this reason the approach of Rothstein J .A. 
should be preferred. 
B. SCHEME VS. SUBSCHEME: AUSTRALIAN GAAR 
The closest eqUivalent element to the Canadian notion of "transaction" is 
the reqUirement under Part IVA ITAA that there be a "scheme" under sub-
sections 177A(1) and (3) ITAA. As noted above, the broad definition of 
scheme in subsection 177A(1) ITAA has been subject to important judicial 
extrapolation, particularly in Peabody 3. As a consequence of this interpreta-
tion, despite the breadth of the definition of "scheme" under subsection 
177A(1) ITAA, the first element of Part IVA ITAA is far from a non-issue. 
First, to be a "scheme" the circumstances must be capable of "standing on 
their own without being 'robbed of all practical meaning.' "83 It will be 
apparent that this formulation of a "scheme" is very similar to the "mutual 
interdependence test" discussed above. 
Second, it is insufficient if only a part of that scheme, a "subscheme," 
satisfies the further elements of Part IVA ITAA. Thus the approach in 
Australia regarding a series of transactions has been completely the opposite 
of that in Canada where under subsection 24S(3)(b) each step in the series of 
78. Ibid. Letourneau J.A. agreed noting "there was overwhelming evidence that the incorporation of 
company 1004568, the formation of the STIL II partnership as well as the transfer to them of the 
portfolio assets were not necessary for STC to effectively sell these assets to an arm's length third 
party such as the appellant": ibid. at para. 127. 
79. Compare ibid. at paras. 47-48. 
80. Ibid. at paras. 49-54 and 58. 
81. Ibid. at para. 130. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. at 4670. While this test has been applied by subsequent courts, as discussed below, recently, 
in Hart 2, supra note 20 while three members of the High Court (Gleeson Co]., McHugh and 
Callinan 11.) applied trus test, two Justices (Gummow and Hayne JJ.) rejected the need to satiSfy 
trus test. 
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transactions is considered. Thus the High Court of Australia stated in FCr v. 
Peabody: 
Part IVA does not provide that a scheme includes part of a scheme and it is pos-
sible, despite the very wide definition of a scheme, to conceive of a set of cir-
cumstances which constitutes only part of a scheme and not a scheme in itself.84 
Importantly, Hill J. added in Fer v. Peabody that: 
[W]here, as a matter of fact, a scheme consists of a course of action comprising 
several steps the Commissioner may [not] isolate out of that course of action 
one step and classify that as a scheme .... [I]n a case where a series of steps con-
stitutes a scheme, that whole series of steps is to be considered, the individual 
steps being seen as parts of the scheme rather than each step being capable of 
being seen as a scheme in itself. 85 
275 
In Spotless Services the requirement that the scheme, rather than the 
subscheme, satisfy the further requirements of Part IVA lTAA was a key rea-
son why the Court at first instance and the full court of the Federal Court, on 
appeal, found that Part IVA lTAA did not apply to the subject facts.86 In this 
case the taxpayer companies invested funds with a bank in the Cook Islands 
so as to take advantage of subsection 23( q) lTAA that at that time exempted 
foreign source income that was taxed in the source country. The funds were 
subject to withholding tax in the Cook Islands at a rate substantially lower 
than Australian income tax rates. Part of the arrangement involved the tax-
payer companies sending an officer to the Cook Islands to effect the loan 
arrangement and, on maturity, to surrender the certificate of deposit in 
return for the principal and interest ($2.96 million). The CommisSioner 
assessed the taxpayer companies on the interest on the basis that either the 
income was sourced in Australia or Part IVA lTAA applied to the arrange-
ment. 
As noted above, both the Court at first instance and the majority of 
the full court of the Federal Court on appeal rejected the Commissioner's 
suggestion that Part IVA lTAA applied to the arrangement. Both courts held 
that the Commissioner's original formulation of the scheme, which was con-
fined to the taxpayers' officer travelling to the Cook Islands with the rele-
vant authority to effect the transactions, was too narrow and not capable of 
standing on its own within the High Court's definition of a "scheme."87 This 
formulation of the scheme ignored other integral aspects of the arrange-
84. Ibid. 
85. Peabody 2, ~pra note 8 at 4111. 
86. While on further appeal to the High Court of Australia the Courts' ultimate conclusion was 
reversed; this was because the High Court disagreed with the lower Court's findings as to the tax-
payers' dominant purpose. The High Court ultimately concluded that the dominant purpose was 
to obtain a tax benefit within Part IVA l1AA: Spotless 3, supra note 21 at 5210 and 5212. The case 
nevertheless provides evidence of the importance of the scheme vs. sub scheme approach under 
Part IVA lTAA. 
87. Spotless 1, supra note 21 at 4416; Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 4805. 
276 OTTAWA LAW REVIEW REVUE DE DROIT D'OTIAWA 
36:2 
ment that occurred both prior to and after the officer travelled to the Cook 
Islands to effect the loan arrangement.88 It was asserted that the scheme had 
to incorporate all of the relevant facts of the case.89 Once all the relevant 
facts were incorporated into the scheme, these courts concluded that the 
dominant purpose underlying the scheme was not tax avoidance, but com-
mercial concerns. 90 
Note, as the doctrine of fiscal nullity was devised in response to the 
absence of a general anti-avoidance provision in the English taxation legisla-
tion, the existence of, among other things, Part IVA ITAA has been held by 
the Australian courts to render the doctrine inapplicable to the Australian 
context.91 
C. EVALUATION 
The Canadian use of the terms "transaction" and "series of transactions" has 
much to commend when compared to the Australian use of the term 
"scheme" and the judicial approach to this notion. First, the inclusion of the 
Canadian deeming proviSion, subsection 248(10) ITA, that defines a "series" 
in terms broader than the common law largely eliminates the need to con-
sider the difficult question under the Australian Part IVA ITAA whether the 
subject factual arrangement is a "scheme" or a mere "subscheme." 
Second, paragraph 24S(3)(b)'s explicit recognition that it suffices 
under the Canadian GAAR if one transaction in the series-the equivalent of 
a "subscheme" under the Australian regimen-has the requisite primary pur-
pose of obtaining the tax benefit, rather than requiring as under the 
Australian regime that the scheme as a whole be so characterized,93 means 
that the issue of identifying the actual scheme is largely nugatory. Once the 
connection between the transactions is established, what facts constitute the 
actual "scheme" is not important under the Canadian GAAR as the exis-
tence of the prohibited purpose prevailing over one part of the scheme will 
suffice to taint the whole scheme. 
The Significance of the differences in this regard in the two GAARs 
can perhaps best be gauged by returning to the leading Canadian and 
Australian cases on this point. In OSFC HoJdings94 the difference in approach 
88. Ibid. 
89. Spotless 1, ibid. at 4797 and Spotless 2, ibid. at 4805. 
90. Note again that on further appeal the High Court of Australia disagreed with this factual conclu-
sion. The High Court ultimately concluded that the dominant purpose was to obtain a tax benefit 
within Part IVA11it.A: Spotless 3, supra note 21 at 5210 and 5212. 
91. John, supra note 8 at 4110. 
92. In this regard recall that to be part of the series the transaction has to be "related" and "complet-
ed in contemplation of the seTiei' within s. 248(10) ITA. 
93. Equally, there is no need for the series of transactions as a whole to be justified by a non-tax pur-
pose, as long as each step/transaction in isolation is based on a bonafide non-tax purpose: Arnold 
& Wilson, "Part 2", supra note 61 at 1161. 
94. OSFC, supra note 16. 
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would not have led to a different conclusion. This is, however, premised on 
the specific facts in that case and, in particular, that each of the four transac-
tions in the series had a primary purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.95 Had a 
contrary factual conclusion been reached, the differences in the two 
approaches could have been crucial. 
Given the interrelationship between each of the transactions as found 
by the Court,96 under the Australian approach each transaction would only 
have constituted a subscheme. Without the other transactions, each trans-
action would have been a meaningless step that could not stand on its own. 
Thus the combination of all four transactions, all the facts, would have been 
necessary to constitute the "scheme". In turn under Part IVA ITAA it would 
have heen necessary to consider the primary purpose of the whole scheme, 
not just one transaction in the series. In slightly different circumstances the 
scheme viewed as a whole might not be so readily viewed as an avoidance 
transaction. As Rothstein J .A. noted, there were both business and tax ben-
efit purposes underlying the acquisition of the partnership interest. The tax-
payer was in the "business of acquiring, arranging and improving distressed 
properties" and had a "bona fide business purpose in acquiring the STIL II 
Partnership interest from Standard."97 Equally from Standard Company's 
perspective, it could be contended that the primary purpose of the liqUida-
tor was a business one, that being the most effective sale of Standard 
Company's assets. To this end it was contended, but rejected by the Courts, 
that Standard Company's primary purpose was enhancing the "value of the 
STIL II portfoliO and to provide greater flexibility in dealing with the assets 
of Standard."98 If the scheme as a whole was characterized as being for busi-
ness purposes, under the Australian approach it would not suffice that one 
step, whether that be Standard Company's transfer of the portfoliO to the 
partnership or the taxpayer's acquisition of the partnership interest, was for 
the primary purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. By contrast, under the 
Canadian GAAR, that one step was based on tax concerns would have been 
sufficient to taint the whole series of transactions. 
Similar conclusions as to the Significance of the differences in the two 
GAARs flow from a consideration of Spotless Services Ltd. v. Fer. The facts 
have been briefly set out above, but are reiterated in a little more detail. The 
95. OSFC, supra note 16 at paras. 47-48 and 127. 
96. The Standard Company transaction had the effect of transferring the portfolio to the partnership 
so that the cost base of the assets of the partnership would include Standard Company's loss. It 
was that cost base and the consequent loss that would accrue to the taxpayer when, by the fourth 
transaction, the taxpayer acqUired its interest in the partnership. The scheme as devised by the 
liquidator was premised on the arm's length purchase of the partnership interest by a third party, 
which would transform the "pregnant" losses into real losses in the hands of the third party. See 
OSFC, ibid. at paras. 38 and 130. 
97. Ibid. at para. 49. llltimately, on the facts, tax benefits were said to be the primary objectives: ibid. 
at paras. 49-54 and 57. 
98. Ibid. at para. 47. 
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successful public float of Spotless Services Ltd. left the taxpayer companies, 
Spotless Services Ltd. and Spotless Finance Pty Ltd., with a surplus of funds 
($40 million) to invest in a suitable short term investment vehicle. An invest-
ment adviser provided them with an information memorandum that 
detailed the rather complex steps that had to be undertaken if the taxpayer 
wished to invest with a bank in the Cook Islands, European Pacific Banking 
Co Ltd ('EPBCL'). A legal opinion supplied with the information memoran-
dum stated that the interest would be exempt from Australian taxation 
under subsection 23( q) ITAA as the steps outlined in the information memo-
randum would ensure that the source of the interest was the Cook Islands 
and hence outside Australia. 
In accordance with this procedure the taxpayers received a telexed 
offer from EPBCL for the investment of their funds. The taxpayer compa-
nies negotiated a higher rate of interest than that offered by EPBCL. The 
interest was, however, still approximately four percent below the Australian 
bank bill buying rate. The taxpayers proceeded to invest the $40 million in 
the manner detailed above. The taxpayers sent one of their officers, Mr 
Levy, to the Cook Islands as attorney with authority to draw a cheque for 
$40 million from the EPBC account, deposit the cheque with EPBCL and 
receive the certificate of depOSit. On maturity, and the surrender of the cer-
tificate of depOSit, the principal ($40 million) and interest ($2.96 million), 
less Withholding tax, were repaid in Australia. The taxpayer companies 
claimed in their taxation returns that the interest was exempt from 
Australian tax under subsection 23(q) ITAA. 
As noted above, the Commissioner's original formulation of the 
scheme was confined to the taxpayers' officer travelling to the Cook Islands 
with the relevant authority to effect the transactions. As also noted above, 
this was held by the Courts to be a subs cherne as it was too narrowly formu-
lated factually and was not capable of standing on its own within the High 
Court's test.99 Rather, the scheme had to include all the relevant facts that 
occurred both prior to and after the officer travelled to the Cook Islands to 
effect the loan arrangement. 
If for the purposes of this example we accept the factual conclusions 
99. Spotless 1, supra note 21 at 4416; Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 4805. 
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of the majority justices 100 in the full court of the Federal Court, the dominant 
purpose underlying the scheme as a whole was obtaining a commercial ben-
efit,l01 namely "obtain[ing] the maximum return on the money invested after 
the payment of all applicable costs, including tax."I02 That a step in that 
scheme had as its dominant purpose obtaining a tax benefit did not suffice. 
By contrast, had the Canadian GAAR been applied, that the scheme as a 
whole was based on business purposes would not have prevented it being 
characterized as an avoidance transaction. That even one transaction was 
inserted into the series of transactions with a primary purpose other than a 
bona fide purpose meant that the whole scheme was tainted and constituted 
an avoidance transaction under subsection 245(3)(b) ITA. 
Thus in a given case the reach of the Canadian GAAR in this regard 
will be Significantly broader than Part IVA lTAA and avoids the complexities 
that have arisen under the Australian scheme vs. subscheme approach. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that the Canadian courts have not had to consid-
er whether the CCRA is bound by its original formulation of the avoidance 
transaction or whether the CCRA or a court hearing an appeal might sug-
gest an alternative factual formulation. As it suffices if only one transaction 
in the series is based on tax considerations, there is no need to suggest vari-
ations of the factual formulation of the series under the Canadian GAAR. By 
contrast, in Australia, because of the importance of identifying a scheme 
that meets the Australian High Court's definition of a scheme, yet also satis-
fies the other prerequisites of Part IVA lTAA, the ability to apply Part IVA to 
alternative factual formulations of the scheme has been critical in some 
cases. While initially divided on the matter, ultimately the Australian courts 
have concluded that the Commissioner of Taxation or any relevant tribunal 
or Court may so suggest alternative formulations of the scheme to which 
Part IVA ITAA may be applied. 103 
100. Cooper J., with whom Northrop]. agreed. Beaumont]. in his dissent concluded that the overall 
scheme was "fiscally or tax driven" in the sense that it was based on exempting the income from 
Australian tax: "Furthermore, in my view, it is not a fair description of these transactions to sug-
gest that the taxation aspects were merely incidental or consequential.. .. The fiscal aspects were 
highlighted in the contemporary documentation. They were clearly at the forefront of the par-
ties' consideration. Without the taxation benefits, the proposal made no sense." Spotless L ibid. at 
4798. Beaumont]. could not identify any commercial justification for the scheme: ibid. Note 
again, on appeal, the High Court of Australia adopted Cooper].' s formulation of the scheme, but 
reversed the full Federal Court's ultimate conclusion, finding that the taxpayers' dominant pur-
pose was obtaining a tax benefit within Part IVA11ilA: Spotless 3, ibid. at 5210 and 5212. 
101. Spotless 2, ibid. at 4810 and 4812. 
102. Ibid. at 4812. 
103. See generally Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4670; Spotless 2, ibid. at 4794,4803; Egan, supra note 20; 
Hart 2, supra note 20 at 4619; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at 4278. If, however, adopting a new for-
mulation of the scheme at a particular stage of the proceedings would unfairly prejudice the tax-
payer, that alternative formulation of the scheme cannot be relied upon: Peabody 3, ibid.; Mochkin 
2, ibid. at 4278 and 4281. 
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A. REDUCTION, AVOIDANCE OR DEFERRAL OF TAX OR OTHER 
AMOUNT: CANADIAN GAAR 
As noted above, a "tax benefit" is defined in exceptionally broad terms in 
subsection 245(1) ITA as "a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other 
amount payable under this Act or an increase in a refund of tax or other 
amount under this Act." The notion of "tax benefit" seems to be compre-
hensively defined to reflect any mode through which a benefit may be 
obtained through the Canadian tax regime, whether that be from the non-
assessability of income, claiming deductions, rebates or credits that would 
not otherwise be available, the avoidance of interest or penalties or the 
deferral of liabilities. 
While the legal definition of a tax benefit may be uncontroversial,104 
there is still the need to factually identify the existence of a tax benefit in a 
given case. Moreover, the existence of a tax benefit does not per se attract 
the Canadian GAAR. There must also be the requisite nexus between the 
tax benefit and the transaction/series of transactions. As would be apparent 
from the above discussion of the legislation, the test prescribed under the 
Canadian GAAR is a "but for" test: subsections 245(2) and (3) ITA. "But for" 
the GAAR, would a tax benefit directly or indirectly accrue to the taxpay-
er?: subsections 245(2) and (3) ITA. This is known as a "results test."I05 "The 
results test requires a determination of whether a transaction or series of 
transactions would, but for the GAAR, result in a tax benefit." 106 
Generally,107 the Canadian courts approach this issue through a 
process known as "benchmarking." 108 Under this approach the court identi-
fies a "benchmark" transaction, "a norm or standard," that the taxpayer 
might otherwise reasonably have undertaken but for the tax benefit and 
against this the existence of a tax benefit is determined. 109 The difference in 
the tax payable had the benchmark transaction occurred rather than the 
avoidance transaction is the tax benefit that has accrued to the taxpayer. l1O 
The benchmark transaction "is not a transaction which is theoretically pos-
sible but, practically speaking, unlikely in the circumstances." 111 Rather a 
104. McNichol, supra note 15 at 2108. 
105. OSFC, supra note 16 at 30l. 
106. Ibid. 
107. As noted below, in the trial decision of Canada Trustco Mortgages Company v. The Q!1een, the Court 
said that benchmarking is not necessary in every case: Canada T rustco Mortgages Company v. The 
Queen, [2003] 4 C.T.C. 2009 at 2030,2003 D.T.C. 587,2003 T.C.C. 215 [Canada Trustco 1 cited to 
C.T.c.]. 
108. David G. Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 
2003) at 172 [Duff, Canadian Income Tax Lawl; Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 238. 
109. McNichol, supra note 15 at 2108. 
110. Ibid. See also Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 62 at 1154-1155; Duff, "Weak-Currency," 
supra note 4 at 238. 
111. Canadian PacifiC Ltd. v. The Queen, [2000] D.T.C. 2428 at 2431 [Canadian Paciflcl]. 
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firmer degree of certainty is required. Thus, in Canadian Pacific, Bonner 
T.C.J. refers to the transaction which the taxpayers "could have done and, in 
my opinion, would, but for the tax reasons, have done."ll2 In that case he 
suggested the benchmark to be "a direct borrowing of [Canadian]$ ... ".113 
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The Canadian courts have, however, yet to grapple entirely with the 
issue of "what if the taxpayer would not have entered into any other trans-
action?" "What if no benchmark can be established?" This matter was raised 
in McNichol. The Court found that, in essence, the tax benefit to the taxpay-
ers was the difference in tax payable had the taxpayers (i) received the sub-
ject distribution of their interest in Bee Company as taxable dividends 
instead of (ii) disposing of their shares to a third party, B Company, and in 
return receiving a concessionally taxed capital gain. 114 Bonner T.C.]. assert-
ed that it "cannot be said that the standard against which reduction is to be 
measured is nil on the basis that, absent a sale of shares, no tax would have 
been payable." 115 The rejection of this argument was, however, based on the 
particular facts before the Court. Bonner T.C.J. found that lldoing nothing 
was never in the realm of the possible, for their goal, present throughout, 
was the realization of the economic value of their shares, which value was 
derived from the accumulated surplus of Bee and nothing else."116 On the 
facts he found that the taxpayers' "choice was between distribution of that 
accumulated surplus by way of liqUidating dividend and sale of the shares 
and in choosing the latter they chose a transaction that resulted in a tax ben-
efit within the subsection 245(1) definition."l17 
This issue was more squarely raised in Canada Trusteo. Briefly, the 
arrangement under consideration involved the taxpayer, Canada Trustco 
Mortgages Company ("CTM Co."), purchaSing from TL Co. trailers that TL 
Co. was leaSing to other third parties. This would allow CTM Co. to depre-
ciate the trailers and deduct the interest incurred in financing the arrange-
ment. The trailers were then leased to another company and then subleased 
back to TL Co. The taxpayers shared the benefits of the arrangement with 
TL Co. via lease rentals. In this case the taxpayer had derived a tax benefit of 
$31 million through the tax deferral flOWing from the capital cost allowance 
provisions ("CCA"). 
Miller J. asserted that some cases do not lend to benchmarking-what 
he referred to as a "comparative analysis."118 The Court suggested that this 
approach was not suitable where the transaction under consideration was 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid. 




118. Canada Trusteo 1, supra note 107 at 2030. 
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not separable from its tax implications. 119 Where there was "no simple tax-
untainted transaction to compare to" 120 the "comparative requirement" 
could not be met. 121 In such cases, instead of comparing the transaction with 
a "normative transaction," the Court compared the "taxpayer's position 
before the purported avoidance transaction" with that after the avoidance 
transaction. 122 In this case, after the subject transaction "there has been a 
deferral of tax compared to prior to the transaction." 123 The Court went on 
to find that the transaction was also undertaken primarily to obtain that tax 
benefit. 124 That this was a "profitable investment in a commercial context" 
did "not outweigh the primary purpose of obtaining the tax benefit from the 
investment-the tax benefit drove the deal."125 The Court, however, ulti-
mately concluded the GAAR did not apply because of the applicability of the 
exception, discussed below. 
Thus Miller J. suggests that no benchmark is necessary in identifying 
a tax benefit. In a given case a tax benefit can exist per se without any need 
for a comparative analysis. While this approach was workable in the context 
of the particular facts of Canada Trustco, it will prove more difficult to identi-
fy a tax benefit in other cases where a benchmark cannot be established. In 
Canada Trustco 126 "but for" the subject transaction the taxpayer would not get 
the benefit of the tax deferral. However, this approach will not be workable 
where the tax benefit is said to be the non-derivation of income, such as in 
Osborne127 and Mochkin, 128 discussed below in the context of Part IV A. Even 
using the approach in Canada Trustco 129 unless the taxpayer has previously 
derived that type of income, a comparison with the taxpayer's position 
before the transaction will not identify a tax benefit. It should be added, 
however, that perhaps that is what Miller J. intended, i.e. that there is no tax 
benefit in such cases. It will be seen below that this is what the Australian 
courts concluded in these cases. 
Duff raises a slightly different, but related, issue. He notes that "while 
this norm [the benchmark] may be appropriate in circumstances in which a 
transaction would not have been carried out but for the tax benefit, it seems 
less appropriate for cases in which the taxpayer might reasonably have been 






124. Ibid. at para. 54. 
125. Ibid. at para. 57. 
126. Ibid. 
127. See Osborne, supra note 21. 
128. See Mochkin 1 and Mochkin 2, supra note 20. 
129. See Canada Trustco 1, supra note 107. 
130. Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 238 n. 41. 
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issue was not raised in McNichol13I because, as noted above, Bonner T.C.J. 
had concluded that only two alternatives were open to the taxpayers in that 
case: receive the amount as an assessable dividend or as a concessionally 
taxed capital gain. 132 However, the benchmarking process will not necessari-
ly prove ineffective when the taxpayer might reasonably have been expected 
to carry out another alternative transaction but for the tax benefit. In such 
cases the benchmark will simply need to be modified to accommodate the 
alternatives available to the taxpayer. The issue will be in such cases "which 
benchmark will the courts use?" Will the relevant benchmark be that which 
would otherwise require the most tax payable? Will it be the scenario that 
would have most logically occurred? It is contended that the Canadian courts 
will adopt the latter approach given their use of a probability test (i.e. "would, 
but for the tax reasons") in determining the benchmark transaction. 133 This 
does not deny that, as Bonner T. C.}. stated in McNichol, 134 in soine cases diffi-
culties will still arise in identifying the benchmark. It simply reflects the fact 
that the matter must be undertaken on a case by case basis. 135 
Another issue that arose in OSFC136 was whether the person who 
receives the tax benefit must be the same person who undertook or 
arranged the avoidance transaction. The facts have been detailed above. The 
taxpayer argued that as it was not a participant in the Standard Company 
transactions (and Standard Company did not obtain a tax benefit from such 
transactions) the GAAR could not apply.137 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, asserting that there was nothing in subsection 245(3) ITA that either 
expressly or impliedly required the person who obtained the tax benefit to 
be the same person who "undertook or arranged the transaction in ques-
tion."138 In the broader scheme of section 245 ITA, the Court found nothing 
linking the actual benefit to the "person or persons undertaking or arrang-
ing the transactions."139 
B. NON-INCLUSION OF ASSESSABLE INCOME AND ALLOWANCE 
OF A DEDUCTION: AUSTRALIAN GAAR 
As noted above, originally "tax benefit" was defined in terms of the non-
inclusion of an amount that would or might reasonably be expected to be 
131. Supra note 15. 
132. Ibid. at 119. 
133. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at 178. 
134. Supra note 15 at 119. 
135. See RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. Y. Canada [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2300, 97 D.T.C. 302 [RMM Canadian 
Enterprises Inc. cited to C.T.C.]. 
136. Supra note 16. 
137. Ibid. at para. 41. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. 
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included in the taxpayer's income140 or the allowance of a deduction that 
would or might not have been expected to be allowable, but for the scheme: 
section 177C(1) ITAA. While the scope of section 177C( 1) has been extend-
ed by the subsequent amendments detailed above, as discussed below it is 
still not comprehensive. 
The Australian legislation adopts a "reasonably expected" test. The 
Australian courts have held that section 177C(1)(a) requires a reasonable 
probability, not a mere possibility, that the taxpayer would have, for exam-
ple, derived the income but for the scheme. 141 This test requires a prediction 
of the events that may have occurred if the tax avoidance scheme had not 
been entered into and the "prediction must be sufficiently reliable for it to 
be regarded as reasonable." 142 
The difficulty that arises where no such 'benchmark' can be predicted 
has received fuller judicial consideration in Australia. This issue was raised in 
Osborne.143 The taxpayer was a qualified valuer. The subject valuation busi-
ness was conducted through two corporate trustees. The taxpayer had not 
previously conducted a valuation business and it was his evidence that he 
would not personally conduct such a business without the protection of lim-
ited liability that a corporate structure afforded. The Commissioner includ-
ed the valuation income in the taxpayer's assessable income, asserting that 
conduct of the business through the corporate trustee was to obtain a tax 
benefit within, inter alia, Part IV A lTAA. 
Olney J. rejected the Administrative Appeal Tribunal's finding at first 
instance that the conduct of the valuation business by the subject corporate 
trustees was to enable the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit, namely the diver-
sion of the taxpayer's personal services income into the family trust. 144 The 
Court so concluded because, inter alia, the taxpayer had not previously 
derived the subject valuation income. 145 The Court found that without a pre-
existing receipt of such income there could be no "diversion" of income, nor 
any suggestion that the corporate trustees were established with that purpose 
in mind. 146 Olney J. stated that once it was established that the taxpayer "was 
not, and had never been, liable to tax on the valuation income derived by [the 
corporate trustee], the Tribunal's approach ... [was] no longer appropri-
140. The first limb of s. 177C(1) mA, definition of tax beneftt, is now clarified by s. 177C(4) lTAA. 
This provides that a tax benefit is made within s. 177C(I)(a) lTAA if instead of income being 
included in the taxpayer's assessable income, the taxpayer makes a discount capital gain. 
141. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4111-4112; Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4671; Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 
4807-4809; WD &. HO Wills (Australia) Pty Ltd. v. FCT (1996),96 A.T.e. 4223 at 4255-4256 [WD 
&.. HO Wills]; CC (NS"W) Pty Ltd (in jiq) v. FCT(1997), 97 A.T.e. 4123; Grollo Nominees Pty Ltd. v. FCT 
(1997),97 A.T.e. 4585. 
142. Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4671. 
143. Supra note 21 at 4329-4331. 
144. Ibid. at 4329-4330. 
145. Ibid. at 4329-4331. 
146. Ibid. at 4331. 
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ate."147 Given such facts, the Tribunal's suggestion that, but for the scheme, 
the taxpayer would have derived the valuation income in his own right was 
erroneous and thus no tax benefit was derived from the scheme. 
A similar argument also found support more recently in Mochkin. 148 
The taxpayer was working in the share broking industry. In 1987 the tax-
payer's commission-sharing arrangement with a stock-broking firm was ter-
minated and he was sued for losses stemming from defaulting clients whom 
he had introduced to the firm. The taxpayer subsequently entered into a sim-
ilar commission-sharing arrangement with another stockbroker, P Co. 
Subsequently the taxpayer arranged for the trustees of his family trusts, 0 
Co. and then L Co., to enter into a contract with P Co. (and later another 
stock broking group), replacing the previous contract that had been directly 
with the taxpayer. During these periods L Co. and D Co. employed the tax-
payer and others in the conduct of their stock broking businesses. During the 
1989-1997 income years the taxpayer did not receive a salary except 
$80,000 from L Co. in 1990. He did, however, receive trust distributions 
from D Co. in 1989 and L Co. in the 1993-97 income years, but these were 
substantially less than the net commission income received by the trustee 
companies. The alleged tax avoidance scheme involved the interposition of 
trustee companies between the taxpayer and various stock broking firms. 
The Court expressed some agreement with the taxpayer's submission 
that there was no tax benefit in that case because, if the scheme had not been 
entered into, the taxpayer would not have carried on the stock broking busi-
ness in his own right. As a consequence of the previous exposure to person-
alliability from his work as a stockbroker, the Court found that the taxpayer 
would not have conducted the stock broking business except through a lim-
ited liability company. 149 Thus, but for the scheme, it could not reasonably be 
said that the taxpayer would have conducted the business in his own right 
and derived the net commission income. ISO 
It should also be noted that the Australian government has stated that 
it intends to amend Part IV A lTAA to ensure that an argument similar to that 
made in Osborne1S1 and Mochkin lS2 cannot be made. 153 To date, however, no 
such legislation has been enacted. 
147. Ibid. 
148. Supra note 20 at 4289-4290. 
149. Ibid. at 4286 and 4289. 
150. Ibid. at 4289-4290. 
151. Supra note 21 at 4329-4331. 
152. Supra note 20 at 4289-4290. 
153. Treasurer's Press Release, 11 November 1999, online: Treasurer of the Commonwealth of 
Australia <www.treasurer.gov.au!tsr ! content! pressreleases!1999!074.asp>. Originally it was 
proposed that the amendments would be operative from this date, but now they will only operate 
from the date the legislation is introduced into Parliament. 
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As noted above, the "relevant taxpayer" is the individual who obtains 
the "tax benefit" stemming from the scheme: section 177D lTAA. The 
Australian courts have concluded that the "relevant taxpayer" need not be 
"the person, or one of the persons, who entered into or carried out the 
scheme" within section 177D lTAA. 154 "They might be one and the same but 
they need not be." 155 Similarly, in the context of the final element under Part 
IV A, namely the requirement of a dominant purpose of obtaining a tax ben-
efit, the Australian courts have held that it is not necessary for the taxpayer 
who obtains the tax benefit to have entered into the scheme with the sole or 
dominant purpose of enabling the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit: section 
177D lTAA. Thus if the promoter of the tax avoidance scheme, rather than 
the taxpayer, has the requisite illegitimate purpose, that will suffice for Part 
IV A lTAA to be attracted. 156 This element is discussed in more detail below. 
C. EVALUATION 
The notion of "tax benefit" under the Canadian GAAR provides a more 
appropriate and comprehensive definition of the concept. IS7 It reflects an 
appreciation that tax benefits stem not only from not declaring assessable 
income or claiming deductions that would not otherwise be available, but 
also making use of any concessions that might be provided under the legisla-
tive tax framework. Advantages may be conferred through the mere defer-
ral of tax or the avoidance or deferral of interest or penalties. Through this 
comprehensive definition of a tax benefit the Canadian GAAR has a broad-
er scope than the Australian provision. Thus despite the amendments listed 
above, section 177C is still far from comprehensive. It does not extend to all 
rebates and credits. ISS It does not extend to the avoidance of penalties or 
interest and does not deal with the benefits stemming from deferral. It is, 
however, proposed to extend the definition of tax benefit so that it will apply 
generally to any reduction or deferral of tax, whether through the non-inclu-
sion of income or allowance of a deduction, loss, rebate or credit. 159 To date, 
such proposals have not been enacted. 
As the above discussion indicates, despite the use of a "but for" test 
under the Canadian GAAR, there is great similarity in the Canadian and 
Australian courts' approaches to determining the connection between the 
tax benefit and the scheme. Both require a reasonable predictability that, 
but for the scheme, the taxpayer would not have derived the subject tax ben-
154. Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4668. 
155. Ibid. 
156. umso/idated Press, supra note 20 at 4360; Vincent, supra note 20 at 4761. See also Sleight, supra note 
20. See FCT v. Gresrhon Investments Pty Ltd. (1987),87 A.T.C. 4988 regarding s. 260 ITAA. 
157. Though it would not extend to the avoidance of tax under a foreign tax Act or other Canadian 
Acts other than the ITA: Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2" supra note 62 at 1154. 
158. See in this regard the earlier comments in Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4117. 
159. Supra note 153. 
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efit. 160 Akin to the Canadian process of 'benchmarking', the Australian 
courts predict the events that may have occurred if the scheme had not been 
entered into and that "predication must be sufficiently reliable for it to be 
regarded as reasonable." 161 
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This point can be reiterated by considering one of the most important 
Australian cases on this point, Peabody v. Fer. The Pozzolanic group of com-
panies was controlled by T Co. (as trustee of the Peabody Family Trust) and 
Mr K and his associates. The beneficiaries of the trust were the taxpayer 
(Mrs Peabody) and her two children. The taxpayer and her husband were 
the sole shareholders and directors ofT Co. Mr Peabody wanted to float 50% 
of the group, the 'Peabody interests,' retaining the other 50%. The conse-
quent need for the Peabody interests to purchase Mr K's shares was prob-
lematic. The sale would have to be revealed in any disclosure document and 
tax would have been payable under section 26AAA lTAA 162 on any profit 
made on the sale of Mr K's shares. These problems were avoided by using a 
shelf company, L Co., to purchase Mr K's interest (through a complex 
financing arrangement with Westpac) and then transforming those shares 
into Virtually worthless 'Z-class' shares. The public float of 50% of T Co.'s 
shares was a great success. The Commissioner included $888,005 in the tax-
payer's income, this representing one third of the net capital gain that would 
have arisen had T Co. bought and then on-sold Mr K's shares to the public 
within 12 months. 
Applying the above test to these facts the full court of the Federal 
Court and the High Court rejected the first instance finding that Part IVA 
applied to the arrangement. Both the Full Court of the Federal Court and the 
High Court held that the scheme did not prOVide the taxpayer with a tax 
benefit within section 177C.163 They found that it was not reasonably proba-
ble that, but for the scheme, T Co. would have bought Mr K's shares as T Co. 
faced considerable difficulties in financing the purchase. Moreover, even if 
T Co. had avoided these difficulties and purchased Mr K's shares, the tax-
payer would not have any present entitlement to any portion of the profits 
arising from the sale of the shares. Hence, there was no reasonable expecta-
tion that, but for the scheme, this profit would flow to T Co. and, in turn, to 
the taxpayer. 164 
The Canadian courts would have come to the same conclusion when 
applying the Canadian "but for" test. As noted above, the benchmark trans-
action "is not a transaction which is theoretically possible but, practically 
160. McNichol, supra note 15 at 2108; Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4111-12; Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 
4807-09; lVD &... HO Wills, supra note 141 at 4255-56. 
161. Peabody 2, ibid. at 4671. 
162. 1his provision rendered assessable any profit arising from the sale of property held for less than 
12 months. 
163. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4116-17; Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4671. 
164. Ibid. at 4671. 
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speaking, unlikely in the circumstances."165 It must be a transaction that the 
taxpayers "could have done and ... would, but for the tax reasons, have 
done," 166 For the reasons detailed above it could not be said that T Co. would 
have bought Mr K's shares. Moreover, as Mrs Peabody was merely one of 
the beneficiaries of the trust it could not be said with the requisite certainty 
that "but for the tax reasons" 167 Mrs Peabody would have received the prof-
its from the sale of the shares. 
As noted above, the Australian courts have given some limited sup-
port to the suggestion that a tax benefit will not be capable of being identi-
fied when it cannot be shown that the taxpayer would have adopted an 
alternative structure if he or she could not use the scheme attacked under 
Part IVA lTAA. Perhaps, in the absence of a benchmark, the Canadian courts 
will also be unable to apply the GAAR in many cases. While the alternative 
approach adopted in Canada Trustco Mortgages Company v. The Queen was 
workable in that particular case, as discussed above it will prove more diffi-
cult to identify a tax benefit in other cases not involving a benchmark. 
In both jurisdictions the relevant taxpayer, namely the person who 
receives the tax benefit, does not need to be the person who undertook the 
scheme. 168 In Australia this issue has been addressed in a slightly different 
context, namely "who must hold the sale or dominant purpose of tax avoid-
ance?" The Australian courts have held that someone who entered into the 
scheme, not necessarily the relevant taxpayer, can hold the requisite domi-
nant purpose of tax avoidance. 169 Similarly, in Canada the requirement 
under subsection 245(3) ITA to identify if the transaction "may reasonably be 
considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide pur-
poses other than to obtain the tax benefit" makes no reference to the pur-
pose haVing to be that of the taxpayer. The decision in OSFe provides a good 
example of this point in the Canadian context. l7O 
v. Purpose of Tax Avoidance 
A. BONA FIDE PURPOSES OTHER THAN OBTAINING A TAX BENEFIT: 
CANADIAN GAAR 
As noted above, an element of the notion of an "avoidance transaction" 
under subsection 245(3) ITA is the need to identify if the transaction "may 
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily 
165. Canadian Pacific v. The Q!Ieen, [2000] D.T.C. 2428 at 243l. 
166. Ibid. 
167. Ibid. 
168. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 41; Peabody 1, supra note 19 at 4595. 
169. Consolidated Press, supra note 20 at 4360; Vincent v. FeT, supra note 20 at 4761. See also Sleight, supra 
note 20. 
170. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 41 
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for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit." To some extent 
this element of the Canadian GAAR has already been discussed. The Courts' 
conclusions in regard to this element in OSFC Holdings and Canadian Pacificl7l 
were discussed above in the context of the meaning of a series of transac-
tions. Similarly, as this element is closely tied to the requirement of a tax 
benefit, to some extent it has been addressed above under that heading. 
Thus, this final element has been considered in the context of McNichol and 
Canada T rustco in the above discussion of the notion of tax benefit. 
It will also be seen that this element is linked to the exemption in sub-
section 245(4) ITA. Thus as the Court noted in OSFC,172 despite the 'tainting' 
effect of subsection 245(3) ITA, discussed above, it is important to identify 
the primary purpose of each transaction in a series as this might determine 
whether the "avoidance transaction would result in a misuse or abuse of the 
provisions of the Act" within subsection 245(4) ITA. 
Leaving aside these factors, however, this element has been given the 
least consideration of all the GAAR elements in Canadian judicial state-
ments. Nevertheless, four additional points can be made in regard to this ele-
ment. First, as a glance at the legislation indicates, through the inclusion of 
the word "primarily," the illegitimate purpose of obtaining the tax benefit 
must be weighed against bona fide purposes and must ultimately prevail. 
Thus incidental tax benefits will not trigger the GAAR. In fact the technical 
notes to section 245 ITA make it clear that even a "significant, but not pri-
mary" purpose of tax avoidance will not suffice. 173 
Second, the purpose is to be determined "at the time the transactions 
in question were undertaken. It is not a hindSight assessment, taking into 
account facts and circumstances that took place after the transactions were 
undertaken." 174 
Third, in OSFCI75 the Court stressed that the primary purpose is deter-
mined on a case by case basis. In that particular case, Rothstein J .A. was 
assisted in identifying a primary purpose of tax avoidance through a "com-
parison of the amount of the estimated tax. benefit to the estimated business 
earnings ... " flOWing from the transaction. 176 Thus in concluding the primary 
171. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at paras. 23-26. 
172. Supra note 16 at para. 51. See further paras. 52-54. 
173. See Canada, Department of Finance, Technical Notes to Bill C-139, 30 June 1988, quoted by 
Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra note 108 at 174. 
174. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 46. See also Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para.l6; Loyens, supra note 
51 at para. 86. 
175. Ibid. at para. 58. 
176. Ibid. Similarly in Water's Edae, supra note 16 at para. 35 the Court noted that the "value of the tax 
loss in the hands of the appellants (all of whom were in a position to absorb it qUickly) when con-
trasted with the income-eaming prospects of the computer makes the predOminant purposes of 
the transactions plain and obvious .... The difference between the amount paid by the appellants 
to acquire their partnership interest ($320,000) and the value of the computer at that time 
(US$7,000) is also indicative of the fact that first and foremost, the appellants paid to acquire a 
tax loss." See also ClTFinanciai Ltd v. The Queen, 2003 D.T.C. 1138, [2003] T.C.C. 544 at para. 31 
[CLTcited to D.T.C.]. 
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purpose underlying the fourth transaction was not "bonafide purposes other 
than to obtain a tax benefit," Rothstein J .A. was assisted by considering the 
"significant disparity between the potential tax benefit to the appellant of 
about $52 million and expected returns from the operation and disposition 
of the STIL II portfolio." 177 However, Rothstein J .A. was cautious, adding 
that this factor will not always be "determinative, especially where the esti-
mates of each are close. Further, the nature of the business aspect of the 
transaction must be carefully considered. The business purpose being pri-
mary cannot be ruled out simply because the tax benefit is significant."178 
Fourth, the courts have noted that subsection 245(3) ITA encompasses 
an objective test. 179 The reference to "reasonably" in subsection 245(3) ITA 
ensures that the conclusion is objectively determined. 180 Related to this 
point, in determining the purpose, the focus is on the transaction, rather 
than the taxpayer. ISI Subsection 245(3) ITA requires an analysis of whether 
the "transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or 
arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax bene-
fit .... " The taxpayer's intentions l82 and the taxpayer's particular circum-
stances are irrelevant. 
Duff adopts a quasi-subjective approach to this element. Duff rejects 
the suggestion that the focus is on the "transaction." Instead Duff restates 
the test as being 'what was the purpose of a reasonable taxpayer "in the tax-
payer's circumstances"?'183 Later Duff suggests the test is 'what are the pur-
poses of the "parties to the transaction"?'184 In response, four points can be 
made. First, as noted above in regard to the need for a tax benefit, the 
reqUirement under subsection 245(3) [fA to identify if the transaction "may 
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily 
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit" makes no refer-
ence to the purpose having to be that of the actual taxpayer, much less anoth-
er party to the transaction. 
Second, and flOWing on from this point, contrary to DufPs suggestion 
"textually" subsection 245(3) is concerned with an objective consideration 
of the "transaction," not the "taxpayer" or the "parties to the transaction." 
177. Ibid at para. 51. 
178. Ibid. at para. 58. 
179. Ibid. at para. 46; Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 16; Loyens, supra note 51 at para. 86. 
180. OSFC, ibid. Compare Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra note 108 at 173; Arnold & Wilson, 
"Part 2", supra note 61 at 1157. 
181. Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2" ibid. at 1157. But see Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, ibid. 
182. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 46. See also Canadian PacifiC, supra note 4 at para. 16; Loyens, supra 
note 51 at para. 86. Nevertheless it is not usual for the court to note the evidence of participants 
as to their primary purpose(s). For example, in Waters Edse, supra note 16 at paras. 34-35 the 
Court refers to the witnesses evidence, but ultimately rejected such in favour of objective factors, 
noting that the Tax Court Judge believed the witnesses could not be believed "on this point." 
183. Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra note 108 at 173. Duff is quoting Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," 
supra note 61 at 1157, however, the insertion of these words is Duff's modification of the quote. 
184. Ibid. at 173, n. 64. 
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Moreover, the inclusion of the word "for" (as opposed to "with") in subsec-
tion 245(3) ITA does not require, as Duff suggests, that subseGtion 245(3) ITA 
be read as "transactions undertaken or arranged by the parties to the transac-
tionfor their purposes .... " Again there is no reference in subsection 245(3) 
ITA to the purposes of the parties to the transaction. The transaction is the 
focus of the analysis. 18s 
291 
Third, contrary to Duff's suggestion, "conceptually" it is possible for 
the transaction to be identified as being undertaken or arranged for a par-
ticular purpose "independent of the purposes of the parties to the transac-
tion."186 This is the very point of the objective test prescribed by subsection 
245(3) ITA. What subsection 245(3) requires is an objective consideration of 
the transaction to determine if, in essence, this transaction is a tax avoidance 
transaction. It will be seen that the 'predication test,' espoused in Newton v. 
Fer,187 and used in Australia, operates in a similar manner fOCUSing on the 
"overt acts by which [the arrangement] is implemented .... " The Court in this 
case asserted that under the predication test we must look at the "arrange-
ment itself and see which is its effect ... irrespective of the motives of the per-
son who made it."188 Thus it is in fact logically possible that a transaction will 
'smack' of tax avoidance when objectively viewed, when factually the parties 
to the transaction subjectively held bona fide purposes. 
Fourth, the legislation makes no reference to the "taxpayer's circum-
stances." Duff's addition into the text of subsection 245(3) ITA turns a clear-
ly objective test into a quasi-subjective test because the reasonable 
conclusion that needs to be drawn will need to be modified by the subjective 
circumstances of the taxpayer. There is no authority for this subjective gloss. 
Similarly, there is no authority to the subjective reference to the "parties to 
the transaction for their purposes .... "189 In this regard it should be noted that 
Duff recognizes the significance of adopting such a quasi-subjective 
approach, rather than the objective approach subsection 245(3) ITA pre-
scribes. He states that: 190 
[T]he objectivity of a rule that considers the purposes that a taxpayer may rea-
sonably have undertaken or arranged a transaction is different from the objec-
tivity of a rule that considers only the purposes of a transaction (assuming that 
these can be defined) independent of the purposes for which the taxpayer 
entered into the transaction. While neither approach recognizes purely subjec-
tive intentions of a taxpayer that cannot reasonably account for the transaction 
undertaken or arranged, only the former allows a taxpayer to argue that non-
tax purposes might not normally account for a particular transaction are in fact 
reasonable and bonafide in that taxpayer's circumstance. (emphasis added] 
185. Ibid. 
186. Ibid. 
187. (1958), 98 C.L.R. 1 at 8 (P.c.). 
188. Ibid. 
189. Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra note 108 at 173, n. 64. 
190. Ibid. at 173-174, fn 64. 
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For the reasons detailed above, subsection 245(3) ITA does not provide for 
such a quasi-subjective approach. To the contrary, the Court in OSFCHoldinBs 
stressed that reference would not be made to "statements of intentions." 191 
To conclude on this element, it might be instructive to consider a fur-
ther judicial example of the Courts' determination of the requisite purpose 
in Water's EdBe. Broadly, the facts in this case were similar to those in OSFC. 
The scheme promoter purchased a 98% interest in a United States partner-
ship (K) on 13 December 1991 for $51,500. On 20 December 1991 the tax-
payers, along with three other indiViduals, paid $320,000 to acqUire 
approximately 93.5% of interests in the partnership. The same day K 
acquired a 50% interest in a limited partnership, ILP. K's contribution to ILP 
was the transfer of an IBM mainframe computer. K had bought the comput-
er in 1982 for US$3.7 million, however, by 1991 it had a market value of 
apprOximately US$7,000; the computer was obsolete in North America. 
The computer was fully depreciated for US tax purposes. Unsuccessful 
efforts were made to lease the computer to, inter alia, various Eastern 
European countries. K recorded a net terminal loss of $4,441,3 90 for the tax-
ation year ending 31 December 1991. The taxpayers claimed their respec-
tive share of this loss ($4,152,700). The taxpayer argued that as the original 
partners had never been subject to Canadian tax, the CCA provision had 
never been applied to the computer. Thus, despite the US depreciation, now 
that there were Canadian partners, in calculating the partnership income for 
Canadian tax purposes it was claimed that a CCA could be claimed on the 
computer's original cost. 
It was not disputed that the transactions prOVided the taxpayer "with 
a substantial tax benefit. Indeed they gained access to a loss totalling 
$4,152,700 (93.5% of $4,441,390) at a cost of $320,000, or 13 cents to the 
dollar .... "I92 The issue, therefore, was whether the primary purpose under-
lying the avoidance transaction was obtaining the tax benefit? The Court 
referred to the witnesses' evidence that they were "entirely" motivated by, 
or that their "major motivation" was, the prospect of participating in the 
data processing business in Eastern Europe. 193 Ultimately, however, the 
Court rejected such in favour of objective factors, noting that the Tax Court 
Judge believed the witnesses could not be believed "on this point." 194 
Approaching the matter in a similar manner to that adopted in OSFC 
Holdings Ltd. v. The Q,ueen,195 the Court noted that the "value of the tax loss in 
the hands of the appellants (all of whom were in a position to absorb it qUick-
ly) when contrasted with the income-earning prospects of the computer 
191. OSFC, supra note 16 at para. 46. See also G:wadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 16. 
192. Supra note 16 at para. 33. 
193. Ibid. at para. 34. 
194. Ibid. 
195. Supra note 16 at para. 58. 
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makes the predominant purposes of the transactions plain and obvious."l96 
The Court also noted that the "difference between the amount paid by the 
appellants to acquire their partnership interest ($320,000) and the value of 
the computer at that time (US$7,OOO) is also indicative of the fact that first 
and foremost, the appellants paid to acquire a tax loss .... "197 The Court con-
cluded that there was198 
no credible explanation for the manner in which the appellants proceeded to 
acquire their interest in the partnership and contribute the computer to another 
partnership prior to the close of its 1991 taxation year, other than the achieve-
ment of the tax benefit which they were seeking. These transactions represent 
one of a variety of ways (some much simpler) in which the appellants could have 
obtained ownership of the computer for the bona fide purpose that they assert. 
However, to trigger the termmalloss and make itavailable to the appellants, it 
was essential that the computer be acquired and disposed of in the manner 
chosen. The quest for the tax benefit is the only reason why the transactions 
unfolded as they did. 
B. DOMINANT PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A TAX BENEFIT: 
AUSTRALIAN GAAR 
The final element of Part IV A lTAA requires that a person, not necessarily 
the taxpayer, must have entered into the scheme with the sole or dominant199 
purpose of enabling the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit: section 177D lTAA. 
In Spotless the Court asserted that the dominant purpose is the "most influen-
tial and prevailing or ruling purpose."200 Thus if the tax benefit is merely inci-
dental to commercial concerns, section 177D LTAA will not apply.201 The 
conclusion under section 177D lTAA must also be reasonable to draw.202 Thus 
a conclusion that is "merely fanciful or not based on reason" will not suf-
fice. 203 This purpose must exist at the time the scheme was entered into.204 
The courts have held that section 177D ITAA requires an "objective 
conclusion to be drawn, having regard to the matters referred to in para. (b) 
of the section, hut no other matters."20S The "actual subjective purpose of 
any relevant person is not a matter to which regard may he had in drawing 
the conclusion.''206 Thus section 177D lTAA is not based upon "the fiscal 
196. Ibid. at para. 35. 
197. Ibid. 
198. Ibid. at para. 36. 
199. Section 177A(5) provides Part IV A may apply to a scheme involVing more than one purpose 
where the dominant purpose is the obtaining of a tax benefit. 
200. Spotless 3, supra note 21 at 5206 and 5210. 
201. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4118; Spotless 3, ibid. at 5211-12. 
202. Hart 2, supra note 20 at 4621. 
203. Ibid. 
204. See FCT v. Consolidated Press Holdines Ltd. (No.1) (1999), 99 A.T.e. 4945 at 4971. Note, while gen-
erally the dominant purpose is determined at the time the scheme is entered into, in certain cases 
the purpose may be considered while the scheme is still being carried on: Vincent, supra note 20 at 
4760; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at 4281. 
20S. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4113. 
206. Ibid. 
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awareness of a taxpayer."207 It is to be determined through an objective con-
sideration, having regard to each and everyone of the eight factors listed in 
section 177D(b) lTAA. 208 In regard to this latter pOint, in Consolidated Press the 
High Court of Australia asserted that it was not necessary for a court to refer 
to each of the matters in section 177D(b) lTAA individually. It suffices if the 
court takes all the specified matters into account in forming "a global assess-
ment of purpose."209 
Part IV A ITAA, particularly section 177D(b)(viii) lTAA, has been held 
to embody a test that originated with section 260 lTAA, namely the "predi-
cation test." Under the predication test, as espoused by Lord Denning in 
Newton, to bring the arrangement within the section you must be able to 
predicate-by looking at the overt acts by which it is implemented-that it 
was implemented in that particular way so as to avoid tax."210 If the arrange-
ment cannot be so predicated, but rather "the transactions are capable of 
explanation by reference to ordinary business or family dealings, without 
necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid tax, then the arrangement 
does not come within the section."211 In so predicating, the "arrangement 
itself' is examined to "see which is its effect ... irrespective of the motives of 
the person who made it."212 Hill 1. in Peabody examined the Explanatory 
Memorandum for Part IV A ITAA2B and found that the legislation was enact-
ed to, inter alia, "restore the law to what it was thought to be after the decision 
of the Privy Council in Newton v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation."214 
Accordingly, he concluded that Part IVA ITAA would "seldom, if ever, ... 
[apply] where the overall transaction is in every way commercial, although 
containing some element which has been selected to reduce the tax payable. 
Part IVA is no more applicable to such a case than was its predecessor's, sec-
tion 260."215 Hence, if the dominant purpose(s) underlying a transaction is, 
inter alia, a business or family reason, Part IVA I1AA will not apply.216 Again, 
Osborne and Mochkin provide two good examples of the application of this test. 
207. Conso]idatedPress, supra note 20 at 4360. 
208. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4113. See also Spotless 1, supra note 21 at 4417; Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 
4810; Spotless 3, supra note 21 at 5210; WD &.. HO Wills, supra note 141 at 4252-55; &stern Nitro8en, 
supra note 20 at 4177; Vincent, supra note 20 at 4517-18; Hart 2, supra note 20 at 4621, 4623-24 and 
4626; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at 4278 and 4281-83. 
209. See also Vincent, supra note 20 at 4517; Hart 2, supra note 20 at 4620; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at 
4281. 
210. Supra note 187 at 8. 
211. ibid. 
212. ibid [emphasis in original]. 
213. The Treasurer, Income Tax Laws AmendmentBill (No.2) 1981: Ex.planatory Memorandum, (Canberra, 
AGPS, 1981) online: Australian Taxation Office <http://www.ato.gov.au>. 
214. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4110. 
215. ibid. at 4118. 
216. Peabody 2, supra note 8; Peabody 1, supra note 19; Peabody 3, supra note 21; "WD ~ HO Wills, supra 
note 141 at 4254. 
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The facts in Osborne have been detailed above. The taxpayer submitted 
that the use of the subject corporate trustees to conduct the valuation busi-
ness was an ordinary commercial and family arrangement within the predi-
cation test. It was contended that using corpqrate entities to obtain the 
protection afforded by limited liability and to enable goodwill to accrue in an 
entity with perpetual succession were legitimate commercial purposes.217 
The taxpayer also asserted that the use of corporate structures for family rea-
sons, such as the sharing of financial benefits and assets between spouses and 
the provision of financial security for the taxpayer's spouse, placed the cre-
ation and use of the corporate trustees outside the reach of both section 260 
and Part IVAIlAA. The Federal Court agreed, declaring that it was lawful for 
the valuation business to be carried on by a company and that all aspects of 
the arrangement complied with the ethical standards of the valuation profes-
sion.218 The Court rejected the Tribunal's suggestion that the purpose under-
lying the arrangement was to enable the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit, 
namely the diversion of the taxpayer's personal services income into the fam-
ily trust. 219 As the taxpayer had not previously derived the subject valuation 
income there could be no suggestion that the corporate trustees were estab-
lished with the purpose of diverting the valuation income.22o 
The facts in Mochkin221 have also been detailed above. While it was 
accepted that one of the taxpayer's purposes in entering into the scheme 
was to obtain a tax benefit,222 the Courts held that a reasonable person would 
not conclude that the taxpayer entered into the scheme for the dominant 
purpose of obtaining that tax benefit. In this case the tax advantages from 
the scheme were subSidiary to the commercial objectives of gaining limited 
liability.223 The taxpayer's dominant purpose in entering into the scheme was 
to "avoid personal exposure to the liabilities and debts which would be 
incurred in the conduct of the business."224 "In the present case, the objec-
tive facts indicate clearly that, following the settlement of [ the] claim against 
him, the Taxpayer was not prepared to conduct the stock-broking business 
on his own account. He had not merely been exposed to possible personal 
liability ... , but had actually been reqUired to make good defaults by his 
217. Relying on a number of s. 260 ITAA cases, such as Newton v. FeT, supra note 187 at 8; Bayly v. FCT, 
(1977),77 A.T.e. 4045 at 4056; Jones v. FCT(1977), 77 A.T.e. 4058 at 4067; R.ippon, supra note 6 
at 4190-9l 
218. Osborne, supra note 21 at 4329. See further the discussion of the Valuation of Land Act, Vic. 1960: 
Osborne, supra note 21 at 4325-27. 
219. Ibid. at 4329-31. 
220. Ibid. 
221. Supra note 20. 
222. That tax benefit was the use of the trustee companies to derive the net income generated by the 
stock-broking business and distributing such in a tax effective way to the beneficiaries of the dis-
cretionary trusts: Mochkin 1, ibid. at 4479; Mochkin 2, ibid. at 4282 and 4287. 
223. Mochkin I, ibid. at 4483; Mochkin 2, ibid. at 4282. 
224. Mochkin 1, ibid. at para. 65. 
296 OTTAWA LAW REVIEW REVUE DE DROIT D'OTIAYIA 
36:2 
clients."225 Thus it was concluded that the taxpayer's "unwillingness to pro-
vide services on his own account after February 1988 was not tax driven, but 
the product of commercial imperatives."226 Another purpose was to "allow 
the business to build up goodwill, which could be detached from the 
Taxpayer's personality and continued participation in the business."227 This 
conclusion was supported by the fact "the income received by [D. Co. and L. 
Co.] was not generated simply by the personal exertion of the Taxpayer."228 
The companies prOvided substantial facilities and employed the services of 
persons other than the taxpayer in the conduct of the business.229 This was 
not merely a "one person business."23o 
One final point that reqUires brief consideration in regard to the legit-
imacy of arrangements with a dominant commercial purpose is whether 
making a transaction tax-effective is in itself a commercial concern. This 
issue arose in Australia as a consequence of comments made by Cooper J. in 
Spotless 2. The facts in this case have been detailed above. Cooper J. said that 
where, as in this case, the "operation of the foreign taxation laws"231 when 
compared to the Australian taxation laws, gave rise to a higher net return 
after tax, tax rates were a legitimate commercial consideration that could 
place an arrangement outside Part IVA ITAA. In such a case, he asserted, the 
dominant "purpose is to obtain the maximum return on the money invested 
after the payment of all applicable costs, including tax .... [T]he dominant 
purpose of the taxpayers was not to obtain a tax benefit."232 
On appeal the High Court rejected this view.233 The Court held that 
just because an arrangement bore a commercial character that did not mean 
that it was not tax driven.234 Thus when determining the dominant purpose 
under section 1770 lTAA, aVOiding the payment of tax to ensure a larger 
commercial return is not a legitimate commercial consideration. This 
225. Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at para. 81. 
226. Ibid. 
227. Ibid. at para. 51. 
228. Ibid. at para. 83. 
229. Ibid. 
230. Ibid. 
231. Spotless 2, supra note 21 at 4811. 
232. Ibid. at 4810-12. See also Dr. Julie CaSSidy, "Are Tax Schemes Legitimate Commercial 
Transactions? Commissioner Taxation v. Spotless Services Ltd. and Commissioner of Taxation v. Spotless 
Finance Pty Ltd." (1996) 2 High Court Review 23, online: High Court Review 
<http://www.bond.edu.au/law/hcrlarticlesI203cassidy.htm>; Dr. Julie Cassidy, "Have the 
Ghosts of Section 260 Come Back to Haunt the Commissioner of Taxation?" (1997) 51 Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 20. 
233. Spotless 2, ibid. at 5206,5210. See also Canada TrusteD, supra note 107 at para. 57. 
234. Spotless 2, ibid. Note, however, that while McHugh J. agreed with this conclusion, he asserted that 
Part IVA would not apply merely because "a taxpayer has arranged its business or investments in 
a way that derives a tax benefit" (at 5212). While these comments may suggest that McHugh J. 
agrees with the sentiments expressed by Cooper J., arguably he is Simply agreeing with Hill J. 
that Part IVA ITAA will not be attracted to commercial arrangements that have merely incidental 
tax benefits. 
TO GAAR OR NOT TO GAAR 
approach has been followed in subsequent cases. Thus, in Consolidated Press 
the High Court declared: 
[A]s was held in Spotless, a person may enter into or carry out a scheme, within 
the meaning of Pt IVA, for the dominant purpose of enabling the relevant tax-
payer to obtain a tax benefit where that dominant purpose is consistent with the 
pursuit of commercial gain in the course of carrying on a business. The fact that 
the overall transaction was aimed at a profit making does not make it artificial 
and inappropriate to observe that part of the structure of the transaction is to be 
explained by reference to a s 177D purpose.235 
C. EVALUATION 
297 
Initially, subsection 245(3) ITA was expressed in terms of" bona fide business 
purposes,"236 thereby incorporating the intended 'business purpose' test, 
referred to above. However, the reference to "business" too narrowly 
described the arrangements that were not intended to be caught by the 
Canadian GAAR. In its original form, subsection 245(3) ITA would be inap-
plicable to transactions that were not carried out in the context of a business 
as defined in subsection 248(1) ITA.237 Moreover, as the ultimate version of 
the legislation reflects, business purposes are not the only legitimate non-tax 
purposes that may underlie a transaction.238 As the Explanatory Notes to 
section 245 ITA state, the provision was "not intended to interfere with legit-
imate commercial and family transactions."239 Under subsection 245(3) ITA 
"[t]he vast majority of business, family or investment transactions will not be 
affected by proposed section 245 since they will have bona fide240 non-tax 
purposes."241 The Australian legislation has similarly recognized the legiti-
macy of, inter alia, business and family transactions through subsection 
177D(viii) lTAA and its incorporation of the predication test. In each case 
this reflects the fact that both governments were concerned to catch blatant 
235. Supra note 20 at para. 96. See also Hart 2, supra note 20 at paras. 50-62; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at 
paras. 41-49. 
236. Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra note 108 at 173. 
237. Ibid.; Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2", supra note 61 at 1155. 
238. Brian J. Arnold, "In Praise of the BUSiness Purpose Test" in 1987 Conference Report: Report of the 
Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) 10:1 at 
10:31 [Arnold, "In Praise"]. 
239. Department of Finance, Report Bulletin No. 585 Extra, "Explanatory Notes: Phase One of Tax 
Reform" (30 June 1988) at 428 [Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes"]. 
240. See Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2", supra note 61 at 1156 (the notion of "bonaJide" purposes in 
s. 245(3) must be intended Simply to refer to genuine purposes). 
241. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes," supra note 239 at 430. 
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and artificial tax avoidance arrangements in contradistinction to, inter alia, 
legitimate family and business transactions.242 
While subsection 245(3) ITA uses the term "primarily" to identify the 
importance of the bona fide purpose and the Australian subsection 177 A( 5) 
lTAA refers to the "dominant" purpose for the application of section 177D 
lTAA, in each case this has ensured that cases involving incidental tax bene-
fits are not caught by either GAAR.243 While in both cases the approach is an 
objective one,244 in Australia the objective determination under section 
177D ITAA must be made having regard to the factors listed in subsection 
177D(b) ITAA and no other facts. 245 In practice, however, this is hardly a lim-
iting factor given the breadth of subsection 177D(b) IlAA. In particular, 
paragraphs 177D(b ) (vii) and (viii) ITAA ensure that all relevant facts are con-
sidered in the objective application of section 177D lTAA. 
There is, however, one significant difference in the Canadian GAAR 
and the Australian Part IVA ITAA. As noted above, under paragraph 
245(3)(b) ITA it suffices if one step in the series of transactions has as its pri-
mary concern obtaining a tax benefit. As also noted above, this is not the 
case under Part IVAITAA. Under the Australian regime, unless a Single step 
in the scheme itself satisfies the definition of a scheme, it will not suffice that 
one step is based on tax considerations.246 In practice, as the above discus-
sion of the sub-scheme approach indicates, this difference could prove cru-
cial and lead to contrary results under the two respective legislative regimes. 
VI. Exception 
A. MISUSE OF PROVISION OR ABUSE OF THE ACT: CANADIAN GAAR 
As noted above, the 'exception' to subsection 245(2) ITA is found in subsec-
tion 245(4) ITA. This states that subsection 245(2) ITA will not apply to a trans-
action where "it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would 
242. See Department of Finance, White Paper, supra note 8 at 57; Second R.eading Speech, supra note 13 
and accompanying text. In Australia, both the former Conunissioner of Taxation, Mr Boucher, 
and the then Treasurer, Mr Howard, have confirmed the embodiment of the Predication test in s, 
177D lTAA. Mr Boucher has stated as relevant to the possible exclusion of Part IVA lTAA any fam-
ily connection between the taxpayer and other parties to the alleged "scheme." He also noted 
that commercial matters carried out for family reasons do not come within the scope of Part IVA. 
These comments were made at a seminar conducted by the Taxation lnstitute of Australia. See 
also Second Commissioner Nolan's address of 15 June 1990. Similarly, the then Treasurer stated 
in his Second Reading speech, the arrangements of a normal business or family kind, including 
those of a tax planning nature will be beyond the scope of Part IVA ITAA. See Second R.eading 
Speech, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
243. It has been suggested that the "sale or dominant" test is less stringent that the s. 245(3) ITA "pri-
marily" reqUirement. See Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1161. 
244. OS Fe, supra note 16 at para. 46; Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 16. 
245. Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4113-14; Spotless 1, supra note 21 at 4417; 'WD &.. HO Wills, supra note 141 
at 4252-55; Eastern Nitroaen, supra note 20 at paras. 72-82; Vincent, supra note 20 at paras. 113-24; 
Hart 2, supra note 20 at paras. 55-58; Mochkin 2, supra note 20 at paras. 26,41-59. 
246. Peabody 3, supra note 21 at 4670. See also Peabody 2, supra note 8 at 4111. 
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not result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an 
abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act, other than this section, read 
as a whole." Strangely, unlike the Australian equivalent and, for that matter, 
the final element of the Canadian GAAR, this exception has had considerable 
judicial consideration. In fact, in most Canadian GAAR cases the application 
of the exception has been a major issue, if not the major issue. 
Four key issues have arisen in regard to this provision in the Canadian 
jurisprudence. First, the very role of subsection 245(4) ITA was initially 
unclear. Is it merely an interpretative section, as was the role of the draft leg-
islation discussed below, or is it a substantive provision? At first glance it 
would appear to be merely an interpretative provision. The section begins 
with the premise "For greater certainty .... " Under this view, subsection 
245(4) ITA: 
does not create an alternative test with regard to the definition of an avoidance 
transaction. Instead, it indicates the proper construction of section 245 with 
respect to transactions that appear to be tax-motivated but that, arguably, do not 
produce tax results that frustrate the intention of Parliament. Thus, subsection 
245(4) is a complement to the non-tax purpose test and is consistent with the gen-
eral approach of a modern, as opposed to a literal, interpretation of the Act.247 
Despite the phraSing of subsection 245(4) ITA,248 the Canadian courts 
have treated the section as a substantive provision that prOvides another sep-
arate issue that must be considered under section 245 ITA,249This is logical in 
light of the effect of subsection 245(4) ITA. It serves to exempt from the 
GAAR a transaction that would otherwise be an avoidance transaction with-
in subsection 245(2) ITA. To have such an effect, subsection 245(4) ITA must 
have a scope that differs from that of the charging provision subsection 
245(2) ITA. Similarly, to have the necessary effect subsection 245(4) ITA must 
have a different scope to subsection 245(3) ITA and its definition of an avoid-
ance transaction. Subsection 245(4) ITA must extend to transactions that, 
while avoidance transactions within subsection 245(3) ITA, were not intend-
ed by Parliament to be caught by the GAAR. Thus its scope is broader than 
subsection 245(3) ITA, having the effect of making "allowance for transac-
tions which the legislature sought to encourage by the creation of tax bene-
fit or incentive provisions or which, for other reasons, do no violence to the 
Act, read as a whole."250 
Thus in OSFC, Rothstein J.A. recognised that subsection 245(4) ITA 
has a substantive role and suggested that the application of the subsection 
entails a two stage approach: (i) identifying the relevant policy underlying 
247. Dodge, supra note 65 at 21. 
248. It has been suggested that the words "For greater certainty" add nothing to the provision. See 
Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1164. 
249. Compare ibid. at 1166. 
250. McNichol, supra note 15 at 120. 
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the subject provision(s) or the Act as a whole and (ii) assessing on the facts if 
the avoidance transaction constitutes a misuse or abuse of that policy.251 The 
Court continued with some caution, however, adding that "to deny a tax 
benefit where there has been strict compliance with the Act, on the grounds 
that the avoidance transaction constitutes a misuse or abuse, requires that 
the relevant policy be clear and unambiguous."2s2 
Second, and related to this first point, if subsection 245(4) ITA is a sub-
stantive provision, it needs to be determined whether it specifies a further 
requirement for the transaction to be caught under the GAAR or whether it 
prOVides a defence or exception. While this may seem to be merely a matter 
of semantics, since either way the tax benefit will not be denied if subsection 
245(4) is not satisfied, the issue does relate to the primacy of the provisions 
and issues relating to the onus of proof. If subsection 24 5(4) ITA provides a 
defence, then subsection 245(2) ITA (which interacts with subsection 245(3) 
ITA) is still the primary provision and subsection 245(4) ITA provides a limit-
ed exception. Moreover, as stated in OSFC, as a "defence" it is the taxpayer 
who should continue to bear the onus of proving the necessary facts to 
refute the assertion "that the avoidance transaction in question results in a 
misuse or an abuse."253 This onus is different from the legal burden of proof 
that applies to any taxpayer who appeals from an assessment. In addition to 
the burden of showing on the balance of probabilities that the assessment 
was wrong, under subsection 245(4) ITA, once the policy underlying a pro-
vision or the Act as a whole is identified,254 the taxpayer then has the "provi-
sional"255 burden of refuting the assertion that this is a misuse or abuse under 
subsection 245(4).256 
By contrast, if subsection 245(4) ITA specifies additional require-
ments/57 it may gain primacy over subsection 245(2) ITA and, in turn, sub-
sections 245(2) and (3) ITA may be read down in light of subsection 245(4) 
ITA. This view was to some extent expressed in Canada Trusteo. In this case 
Miller J. asserts that the "threshold [under subsections 245(2) and (3) ITA] is 
not particularly high" and "the GAAR emphasis" in that case should be 
placed on the misuse and abuse issue under subsection 245(4) ITA.2sB 
251. OSEe, supra note 16 at para. 69. See also Donahue, supra note 16 at para. 14; Loyens, supra note 51 
at paras. 93, 98. 
252. OSEe, ibid. at para. 69. See also jabin, supra note 16 at para. 4; Donahue, supra note 16 at paras. 
16-17; Water's Edne, supra note 16 at 48; Loyens, ibid. at para. 98; Imperial Oil, supra note 16 at 
paras. 38-39. 
253. Ibid. at para. 68. 
254. Ibid. (at which stage no onus is borne by either party). 
255. Rt. Hon. Mr Justice Denning, "Presumptions and Burdens" (1945) 61 L.Q.R. 379 at 379-80. 
256. OSEe, supra note 16 at para. 68. See also Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2", supra note 61 at 1168. 
257. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 17 (s. 245(4) was treated as an extra requirement before the 
GAAR is satisfied, rather than an exception/defence). See also Imperial Oil, supra note 16 at 
paras. 35, 40, 67. 
258. Supra note 107 at para. 55. 
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Third, should a literal interpretation or a purposive approach be 
adopted when determining if there has been a misuse or abuse of a provi-
sion(s) or the Act? It will be seen that some Canadian courts, in particular the 
Courts in Canadian Pacific Ltd. 259 and G:Inada TrusteD, have resurrected the pre-
GAAR literal approach found in, inter alia, Shell Canada when applying sub-
section 245(4) ITA. There are in fact two aspects to the approach adopted by 
these Courts. First, under this approach as long as the taxpayer satisfies the 
literal reqUirements of the relevant section the Courts will hold there is no 
misuse of that provision under subsection 24 5(4) ITA. Second, and related to 
this first pOint, in considering if there is such a misuse or an abuse of the Act 
as a whole, the legal rights/form of the transaction, not its substance, is con-
sidered. If as a matter of form the transaction accords with the 
provision(s)/ Act, that the transaction has a contrary effect in substance is 
not relevant to whether there has been a compliance within subsection 
245(4) ITA. 
The facts in G:Inadian Pacific have been detailed above. Even though, as 
noted above, the Courts in this case concluded that there was no avoidance 
transaction and thus there was no need to consider subsection 245(4) ITA, 
both Bonner T.C.J., at first instance, and the Court of Appeal did examine 
the issue. It was argued that there was an abuse of the Act as a whole because 
the arrangement allowed the taxpayer to deduct payments that were pur-
portedly interest when in fact they partially constituted principal. 260 Both 
Bonner T.C.). and the Court of Appeal relied on the pre-GAAR decision 
Shell Canada where the literal rule and legal rights approach were used, as 
authority for the proposition that there was no misuse or abuse within sub-
section 245(4) ITA.261 Moreover, neither Bonner T.C.J. nor the Court of 
Appeal would entertain the argument that there had been an abuse of the 
Act, adopting a legal rights/form approach to the transaction. The Courts 
said that under the terms of the debenture document the payments were 
interest, not principal.262 The Courts would not recharacterize them as par-
tially principal in the course of considering if there was an abuse of the Act.263 
If the reality of the arrangement had been considered, the consequent deduc-
tion of inflated interest payments was a misuse of subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i) 
ITA and the deferral of tax through the "locked-in foreign exchange gain at a 
preferential rate" was a misuse of the capital gains provisions.264 Further, as 
reiterated below, such weak-currency transactions constitute an abuse of the 
ITA read as a whole. However, as the Courts refused to look at the economic 
259. Canadian Pacific, supra note 4 at para. 32-34. 
260. Ibid at para. 29. 
261. Ibid. at paras. 32-34. 
262. Ibid. at para. 30. 
263. Ibid. at paras. 33-34. 
264. Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 239. 
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reality of the transactions, these views would not be entertained. 
The approach in Canadian Pacific was recently followed in Canada 
T rustco. 265 Again, the facts have been detailed above. It had been argued that 
there was a misuse of the CCA provisions because the facts involved no real 
money being invested, "only a shuffling of paper."266 In considering this issue 
the Court began by adopting the legal rights/form approach and the literal 
rule, to determine if the prerequisites to the CCA had been met. The Court 
asserted that neither the "economic realities" of a transaction nor the "gen-
eral object and spirit of the provision at issue" could supplant the clear and 
unambiguous terms of a provision.267 Thus legal form, not economic reali-
ties, determined the deductibility of the amounts under the CCA.268 
Then, in considering if under subsection 245(4) ITA economic realities 
or legal form would be considered, the Court followed Canadian Pacific. The 
Court refused to accept the argument that there had been a misuse of the 
CCA on the basis that it would involve recharacterizing, inter alia, the legal 
form of the transaction.269 The Court reiterated that under subsection 
245(4) ITA the "transaction must be viewed in its legal context" to determine 
if it is abusive.27o Given (as a matter of form), that the requirements for 
deductibility under the CCA existed, the Court concluded there was "no 
misuse of the CCA provisions."271 Again, if a purposive approach was adopt-
ed in relation to subsection 24 5(4) ITA and the substance, not the form, of the 
transaction was considered, the circularity of the purchase and leaseback 
arrangement and the absence of any real capital costs to the taxpayer should 
have indicated that this was a misuse of the CCA provisions and an abuse of 
the Act as a whole. 
To this end it is relevant to note a purposive approach was adopted in 
OSFC.272 Rothstein J.A. asserted that what "constitutes a 'misuse' of the Act 
depends upon the object and spirit of the particular provision under scruti-
ny."273 He continued by stating that the "abuse analysis will involve a consid-
eration of the avoidance transactions in a wider context, having regard to 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act read as a whole and the policy behind 
265. Canada Trustco 1, supra note 107. The decision was upheld on appeal in Canada Trustco, supra note 
16. 
266. Canada Trustco 1, ibid. at para. 69. 
267. Shell Canada, supra note 4 at paras. 39-40, cited in Canada Trustco 1, supra note 107 at para. 70. 
268. Canada Trustco 1, ibid. at paras. 69-73. 
269. Ibid. at paras. 69, 74, 76-79. 
270. Ibid. at para. 77. 
271. Ibid. at para. 89. 
272. Supra note 16 at para. 61. See also McNichol, supra note 15 at 2112-13; Irnperj(,l} Oil, supra note 16 at 
paras. 36-37,45; RMMCanadian Enterprises Inc., supra note 135 at paras. 51-54; Duncan et. al. v. The 
Queen, [2001] D.T.C. 96, [2001] 2 C.T.C. 2884 [Duncan cited to D.T.C.]. 
273. Vern Krishna, TaxAvoidance: The GeneralAnti-Avoidance Rule, (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 51 
[Krishna, Tax AVOidance], cited in OSEe, ibid. at para. 61 [emphasis added]. 
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them."274Jt is not sufficient "merely to rely on the technical language of the 
particular provision or scheme of provisions."275 Further, determining the 
"object and spirit" or "policy" can be assisted by reference to extrinsic mate-
rials, such as "technical notes, writings, Hansard and enacting notes."276 
Rothstein J .A. rejected the taxpayer's suggestion that in assessing mis-
use and abuse the literal approach that confined the court's consideration to 
the "language of the provisions themselves," as espoused in Shell Canada was 
to be applied.277 The Court recognized that the literal approach would ren-
der the GAAR meaningless.278 Under the literal approach as long as the tax-
payer satisfies the literal requirements of the section there is no misuse of 
the provision. However, it is a given that the taxpayer has strictly satisfied 
the reqUirements of the provision. This is because the "GAAR is a weapon 
oflast resort"279 that can only operate when the literal requirements of a pro-
vision(s) have been met and the tax avoidance scheme is otherwise effec-
tive.28o As the Court in CITlater reiterated, the GAAR "must be considered 
after the specific sections have been considered and, if possible, applied. 
GAAR does not subsume or encompass the other sections of the Income Tax 
Act, nor is it a substitute for them."2s1 Thus the courts need to first consider 
whether the loss, for example, can be claimed under the requisite section282 
and/or that no sham exists.283 In addition, a specific avoidance provision 
may need to be considered.284 It is only once these matters have been deter-
mined that the GAAR issue arises. Thus, logically, subsection 245(4) ITA 
must be concerned with the policy underlying the subject provision or Act 
asa whole, not whether it has literally been satisfied. 
As the technical notes state, not to adopt the purposive approach to 
subsection 245(4) ITA would defeat the very "object and purpose" of section 
274. OSFC, ibid. at para. 61 [emphasis added]. 
275. Vern Krishna, The Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 1419, 
cited in OSFe, supra note 16 at para. 65. 
276. Ibid. at para. 63. See also Loyens, supra note 51 at paras. 100-106 (where such extrinsic evidence 
helped the Court conclude there was no misuse of the object and spirit of ss. 85 and 97 as the sub-
ject transaction did not involve a conversion of business income to capital gains). Compare 
Imperial Oil, supra note 16 para. 49. 
277. OSEC, supra note 16 at paras. 61-62. 
278. Ibid. at paras. 63, 117. 
279. CIT, supra note 176 at para. 66. See also sm, supra note 16 at para. 26; Imperial Oil, supra note 16 at 
para. 31; Arnold & Wilson, "Part2,» supra note 61 at 1165. 
280. OSEC, supra note 16 at para. 63. See also RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc., supra note 135 at 311; 
Duncan, supra note 272 at 110-11; CIT, ibid. at paras. 66,70; Imperial Oil, ibid. at para. 30. 
281. CIT, ibid at para. 71. 
282. See e.g. Waters £loe, supra note 16. Compare Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1165. 
283, See e.B. McNichol, supra note 15 at 2098. See also RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc., supra note 135; 
Michelin 2, supra note 15; CIT, supra note 176 at para. 70. 
284, See generally Crr, ibid. at para. 74 (the Court found there was no need to invoke the GAAR as a 
specific anti-avoidance provision, s. 69 applied); RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc., ibid. (the Court 
found there was no need to resort to the GAAR because s. 84(2) deemed the distribution to be a 
dividend). See also sm, supra note 16 at para. 26; Imperial Oil, supra note 16 at para. 30. 
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245ITA.285 "Where a taxpayer carries out transactions primarily in order to 
obtain, through the application of specific provisions of the Act, a tax bene-
fit that is not intended by such provisions and by the Act read as a whole, sec-
tion 245 should apply ... even though the strict words of the relevant specific 
provision may support the tax result sought by the taxpayer."286 
Equally, as indicated in McNichol v. The Queen,287 the whole idea of sub-
section 245(4) ITA is dearly to consider the substance, not the legal form, of 
the avoidance transaction, to determine if there has been a misuse of the par-
ticular provision or an abuse of the Act as a whole. As the technical notes 
state, "a transaction structured to take advantage of technical provisions of 
the Act but which would be inconsistent with the overall purpose of these 
provisions would be seen as a misuse of these provisions."288 Again, it is a 
given that the taxpayer has as a matter of legal form satisfied the require-
ments of the provision, otherwise he or she would not have obtained his or 
her tax benefit in the first place. If the court cannot look at the substance of 
the transaction to determine if there is a misuse or abuse, subsection 245(4) 
ITA will again be nugatory. The approach taken to this aspect of subsection 
245(4) ITA in cases such as Canadian Pacific involves the "tail wagging the dog" 
in the sense that the legal form will wrongly dictate if there is a misuse or 
abuse of relevant policy. 
Moreover, these issues raise the simple question of the "relevance of 
the conclusions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Shell Gmada on the basis 
that they reflect pre-GAAR modes of thinking that the enactment of GAAR 
was intended to transform."289 As Rothstein J.A. stressed in OSFC given that 
in none of the cases (such as Shell Canada) upon which the taxpayer relied for 
the literal approach did the courts consider the current version of section 
245, "these statements of the Supreme Court cannot be said to apply to a 
misuse and abuse analysis under subsection 245(4)."290 
Fourth, it will be apparent from subsection 245(4) that it has two limbs: 
. is there a misuse291 of a provision( s )292 of the Act? 
285. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes", supra note 239 at 432. See Dodge, supra note 65, 
where the then Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Finance asserted in 
regard to s. 245(4), the subsection "is a complement to the non-tax purpose test and is consistent 
with the general approach of a modern, as opposed to a literal, interpretation of the Act." (at 21). 
286. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes", ibid. at 431-32. 
287. Supra note 15 at 2112-13 (subsequently adopted in RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc., supra note 144 at 
2313). 
288. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes," ibid. at 432. 
289. Duff, "Weak-Currency," supra note 4 at 239. 
290. Supra note 16 at para. 65. 
291. See generally Jabin, supra note 16 at para. 2: the Court stated that if a particular provision is not 
used (in that case section 80), then it cannot be "misused"; Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 
61 at 1167: "A transaction that avoids certain sections might, however, be found to be an abuse of 
the Act as a whole." 
292. See generally Imperial Oil, supra note 16 at para. 46 (as subsection 245(4) Ir4 refers to "provi-
sions", a consideration may be had to both the specific provision under consideration, and also 
any related provisions). 
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. is there an abuse of the Act when read as a whole? 
In certain cases the courts have read down the second test in light of 
the first test and thereby rendered the former meaningless. In essence, in 
these cases the courts ask whether, literally, the requirements of the partic-
ular provision under which a deduction, for example, is claimed have been 
satisfied (i.e. applying the first limb) and if they have, the courts assert there 
is no abuse of the Act under the second limb. Thus the Courts in Canadian 
Pacific asserted there was no abuse of the Act as a whole because the Court 
in the pre-GAAR case Shell Canada found that such transactions were not a 
misuse of the particular provision allowing for the deduction of the subject 
interest payments, subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i) ITA. The Courts did not consid-
er if the transaction was an abuse of the Act as a whole independently of 
their consideration of subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i) ITA.293 
Thus the Courts' consideration of the second limb of subsection 
245(4) ITA was dismissive, simply relying on a quotation from Shell Canada. 
The issue of an abuse of the Act should have been considered independently 
of the issue whether there had been a misuse of subparagraph 20(1)( c)(i) ITA. 
As Duff suggests, had this been done, arguably such "weak-currency bor-
rowing is abusive in this more general sense, even if it does not contradict 
the object and spirit of paragraph 20(1)(c)."294 
A similar approach to that adopted in Canadian Pacifid95 was recently 
confirmed in Canada Trustco. 296 Miller ]. stated that a consideration of 
whether there is an abuse of the Act read as a whole was "an exercise in the 
absurd."297 The Court stated that "the analysis of the misuse of the provisions 
and the analysis of the abuse having regard to the provisions of the Act read 
as a whole are inseparable."298 He identified the policy of the Act as a whole, 
as the policy· underlying the particular CCA provision.299 As noted above, 
Miller J. concluded that given, as a matter of form, the requirements for 
deductibility existed, there was "no misuse of the CCA provisions."300 
Contrary to this approach, in McNichol, Bonner T.C.]. recognized that 
there were two distinct tests.301 The taxpayer contended that the French ver-
sion of subsection 245(4) ITA indicated that the misuse and abuse tests were 
substantially the same. In rejecting this assertion the Court stated, as quoted 
above, that subsection 245(4) ITA "must have been intended to make 
allowance for transactions which the legislature sought to encourage by the 
293. Supra note 4 at para. 31-32. 
294. Duff, "Weak-Currency", supra note 4 at 239. 
295. Supra note 4 at para. 16. 
296. Supra note 107. 
297. Canada Trusteo 1, supra note 107 at para. 90. 
298. Ibic/. 
299.lbid. 
300. Ibid. at para. 89. 
301. Supra note 15 at 120. 
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creation of tax benefit or incentive provisions or which, for other reasons, 
do no violence to the Act, read as a whole."302 The Court went on to con-
clude that the subject facts involved a misuse of sections 38 and 110.6 and an 
abuse of the Act as a whole. 303 The facts involved "a classic example of sur-
plus stripping [and] cannot be excluded from the operation of subsection 
(2) .... The scheme of the Act calls for the treatment of distributions to share-
holders of corporate property as income ... even those of a less orthodox 
nature than an ordinary dividend."304 
The suggestion that the misuse and abuse tests were one and the same 
was also rejected in .RA1M Canadian Enterprises Inc.,305 Imperial OiP06 and 
OSFC. 307 The Courts recognized that subsection 245(4) ITA involved two dis-
tinct tests. Thus, in the latter case, Rothstein J .A. stated that the "first ques-
tion is whether it may reasonably be considered that any of the avoidance 
transactions would result in a misuse of a specific provision or provisions of 
the Income Tax Act .. .. If not, it is then necessary to determine whether it may 
reasonably be considered that any of the avoidance transactions would 
result in an abuse, having regard to the proviSions of the Act, other than sec-
tion 245, read as a whole."308 Rothstein J.A. added that the latter involves a 
"wider question and requires an examination of the inter-relationship of the 
relevant statutory provisions in context."309 This was significant in that case 
because Rothstein J .A. adopted a narrow construction of the policy under-
lying subsection 18(13) ITA, concluding that the taxpayer's acquisition of the 
partnership interest was not a misuse of subsection 18(13),310 but ultimately 
found that there was an abuse of the Act. Rothstein J .A. found that the" gen-
eral policy of the Income Tax Act is against the trading of non-capital losses by 
corporations, subject to specific limited circumstances."311 The subject 
avoidance transaction had had the effect of transferring "the loss from one 
corporation to another through the mechanism of subsection 18(13) and the 
Partnership Rules. Having regard to the GAAR, these transactions violated 
302. Ibid. [emphaSiS added]. 
303. Ibid. at 121-22. 
304. Ibid. at 120-21. 
305. Supra note 135 at 312. 
306. Supra note 16 at paras. 35-37,41-43 and 48. 
307. Supra note 16 at para. 60. 
308.Ibid. at para. 59. 
309. Krishna, Tax Avoidance, supra note 273 at 51, cited in OSEC, supra note 16 at para. 61. 
310. OSEC, ibid. at paras. 76 and 79-80. Compare para. 134 (Letourneau J.A. believed there was both a 
misuse of s. 18(3) and an abuse of the Act as a whole. In regard to the former, it was suggested 
that s. 18(3) was not intendeil to be used by a corporation to increase the adjusted cost base of a 
related corporation or partnership for the purpose of selling its losses to an arm's length corpora-
tion). See also Waters £doe, supra note 16 at paras. 44-47, 51 (regarding this broader approach to 
the policy behind s. 18). 
311. OSFC, ibid. at para. 98. 
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the general policy of the Act against the transfer of losses from one corpo-
ration to another."312 
307 
Again, a merger of the misuse and abuse tests is contrary to 
Parliament's intent. As the technical notes to subsection 245(4) state, "[A] 
transaction may be abusive having regard to the Act as a whole even where it 
might be argued, on a narrow interpretation, that it does not constitute a mis-
use of specific provisions."313 Parliament clearly intended two separate tests. 
B. EXPRESS CHOICES, ELECTIONS OR OPTIONS: AUSTRALIAN GAAR 
As noted above, the exception to the Australian Part IVA lTAA is found in an 
exclusionary limb in the definition of "tax benefit." Subsection 177C(2) 
ITAA excludes from the notion of tax benefit the non-inclusion of income, 
the allowance of a deduction, the incurring of a capital loss or allowance of 
a foreign tax credit that is "attributable to the making of an agreement, 
choice, declaration, election or selection, the giving of a notice or the exer-
cise of an option" expressly provided for by the lTAA or lTAA 1997. The sec-
tion includes, however, an extra caveat that requires that the scheme was 
not entered into or carried out to create a circumstance or state of affairs 
"which is necessary to enable the declaration, agreemeht, election, selec-
tion, choice, notice or option to be made, given or exercised." 
Unlike the Canadian eqUivalent, the meaning of this exclusionary 
limb has not been the subject of much comment. The language used in the 
provision suggests that it embodies what was referred to in the section 260 
jUrisprudence as the narrow,314 rather than the broad, choice principle. 315 This 
is because subsection 177C(2) is confined to an agreement, etc. express!J 
prOvided for by the Act. It would not, therefore, extend to provisions that 
have an implied impact on particular arrangements; for example, provisions 
which merely prOvide for the tax consequences of particular arrangements, 
such as the use of a particular business entity.316 In a manner akin to the nar-
312. Ibid. at para. 105. See also ibid. at para. 113. The Federal Court refused to overrule OSFC (Kau/ius, 
supra note 10). 
313. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes," supra note 239 at 432. 
314. In Crid/and, Mason j. explained the choice principle "proceeds on the footing that the taxpayer is 
entitled to create a situation by entry into a transaction which will attract tax consequences for 
which the Act makes specific prOvision and that the validity of the transaction is not affected by s. 
260 merely because the tax consequences which it attracts are advantageous to the taxpayer and 
he enters into the transaction deliberately with a view to gaining that advantage." Supra note 4 at 
339 [emphasis added]. Under the narrow interpretation of the choice principle, taxpayers are 
only so protected where the Act extends a specific choice or right to elect to have income treated 
in a particular way for assessment purposes. It is not suffiCient that the Act recognizes entities, 
such as companies and trusts, for the taxpayer to legitimate his or her use of these entities under 
the narrow choice principle. See e.g. Gulland, supra note 6. 
315. Under the broad interpretation of this doctrine, s. 260 could not apply where taxpayers had 
arranged their affairs to take advantage of the Act's treatment of a particular arrangement or 
form of income (not necessarily involving a specific express provision of the Act) even though the 
taxpayer had entered into the arrangement with the sole or dominant purpose of attracting that 
tax benefit. See e.g. Crid/and, ibid. 
316. Case W58, supra note 8 at paras. 63-66. 
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row choice principle, however, subsection 177C(2) prima facie validates 
schemes that utilise specific choices provided under the Act, such as those 
that extend a choice between alternative accounting methods and trading 
stock elections. Beyond this, however, the meaning of "an agreement, 
choice, declaration, election or selection, the giving of a notice or the exer-
cise of an option" expressly provided for by the Act is uncertain. 
As noted above, subsection 177C(2) includes a further caveat. 
Subsection 177C(2) will not exempt the tax benefit when the scheme was 
entered into to enable the otherwise exempt tax benefit to be attracted. 
Thus where taxpayers purposely enter into an arrangement to enable them 
to take advantage of a tax benefit extended expressly by some provision of 
the Act, subsection 177C(2) will not 'exempt' the arrangement from Part 
IVA. Unlike section 260, where the choice principle could operate even 
where the taxpayer purposely entered into the arrangement with the sole or 
dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit,317 section 177C(2) will not 
exempt the tax benefit when the scheme was entered into to enable the tax 
benefit to be attracted. Thus an election, for example, under the Act will not 
fall outside Part IVA where the taxpayer entered into the subject arrange-
ment with the purpose of enabling him or herself to be able to exercise that 
election and receive the consequent tax benefit. 
C. EVALUATION 
The original version of section 245 ITA. did not include a prOvision akin to the 
current subsection 245(4) ITA. Instead the Canadian Parliament Simply 
included a purpose clause in the legislation that indicated that the purpose of 
the section was "to counter artificial tax avoidance."318 There was, however, 
concern that a purpose clause had been used instead of a preferred substan-
tive exemption.319 It was also suggested that the clause was unclear and that 
despite this provision the GAAR might apply to arrangements that either 
the Act had expressly sought to encourage or at least were consistent with 
the Act. 320 As a consequence of this concern the current version of subsec-
tion 245(4) ITA was enacted. 
The purpose of both prOvisions 177C ITA and 24 5(4) lTAA was largely 
the same. While technically some transactions would be "avoidance transac-
tions," the Canadian Government did not mean for the GAAR to apply to 
those transactions that either fell in the realm of those which Parliament 
317. Crid/and, supra note 4 at 339. 
318. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes," supra note 239 at 432. 
319. Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1163. 
320. David C. Nathanson, "The Proposed General Anti-Avoidance Rule" in 1987 Conference Report-
Report ofProceedinss of the Thirty-Ninth Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) 
9:01 at 9:23-9:26. See also Arnold, "In Praise," supra note 238 at 10:31; Arnold & Wilson, "Part 
2," ibid. at 1163-64. 
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sought to encourage through concessional tax. treatment or did not offend 
the "object and spirit" of the Act as a whole. 321 In this regard it will be 
recalled that both governments were concerned to "prevent artificial tax 
avoidance arrangements."322 Neither government intended to undermine 
their efforts to promote certain business transactions. Unlike the Australian 
provision, subsection 177C(2) ITAA, subsection 24S( 4) ITA has proven highly 
controversial. Much of this uncertainty has been caused by certain Canadian 
courts using pre-GAAR law to read down the scope of subsection 24 5(4) ITA 
to render the GAAR meaningless. 323 This is extremely concerning given that 
the explicit language used in subsection 245(4) ITA requires the courts, in 
applying subsection 245(4) ITA, to take a purposive approach. The technical 
notes, as quoted above, also indicate that a purposive approach and an 
appreciation beyond mere legal form was intended in the application of sub-
section 245(4) ITA. 
Yet, as noted above, some Canadian courts, in particular the courts in 
Canadian Pacifk324 and Canada Trustco, have continued to use an outdated 
approach to statutory interpretation despite these legislative directives and 
as a consequence their interpretations have served to render subsection 
245(4) ITA meaningless. For the reasons outlined above, the preferential 
approach to subsection 245(4) is for the courts (i) to adopt the prescribed 
purposive approach;325 (ii) to look at the substance, rather than just the legal 
fonn, of the arrangements and (iii) to apply two separate tests that reqUire 
consideration of a misuse of the relevant provisions or an abuse of the Act as 
a whole. This accords with both legislative intent and logic and has found 
support in certain Canadian cases, in particular in OSEe. 
The confusion that exists in regard to subsection 245(4) ITA in 
Canadian jurisprudence may suggest that the better approach was that 
adopted in Australia in subsection 177C(2) ITAA. Perhaps it would have been 
preferable in Canada to Simply include an exclUSionary limb in the definition 
of tax benefit as in Australia. This would have excluded any uncertainty as to 
whether subsection 245(4) ill was merely an interpretation section or 
whether it was intended to have substantive effect. Most importantly, the 
confuSion as to what was intended to be excluded by subsection 245(4) ITA 
321. Department of Finance, "Explanatory Notes", supra note 239 at 432. See also CCRA Information 
Circular 88-2, "General Anti-AVOidance Rule-Section 245 of the LT." (21 October 1988). 
322. Department of Finance, White Paper, supra note 8 at 57. In Australia the Treasurer stated that Part 
IVA w~ introduced "to strike down blatant, artificial or contrived arrangements, but not cast 
unnecessary inhibitions on normal commercial transactions by which taxpayers legitimately take 
advantage of the opportunities available for the arrangement of their affairs." See Second Readina 
Speech, supra note 13 at 2684 (Mr Howard, Treasurer). 
323. Compare Brian J. Arnold, "Reflections on the Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation 
and Tax Avoidance" in Erlichman, ed., Tall. Avoidance in Canada: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
(toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) 41 at 80 [Arnold, "Reflections"]. 
324. GlOadian Pacific, supra note 4 at paras. 32-34. 
325. See especially Arnold, "Reflections," supra note 323. 
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may have been avoided. Thus, the Australian legislation is phrased far more 
specifically than subsection 24 5( 4) ITA. Subsection 177C(2) lTAA is concerned 
with express concessions and not concerned with the "object and spirit" of a 
provision(s), much less the policy underlying the Act as a whole. Hence, the 
language used in subsection 177C(2) LTAA may not have truly reflected the 
legislative concern in Canada to preserve arrangements that must also be in 
keeping with the underlying policy. Thus a properly administered subsection 
245( 4) ITA (in the sense that it is appropriately interpreted and applied by the 
judiciary) may be preferable in ensuring that only those transactions that 
were not intended to be caught by the GAAR will be exempted. 
Subsection 177C(2) has as a preferential feature to subsection 24 5(4) 
the reference to the taxpayer's intentions as a relevant consideration to its 
applicability, While subsection 177C(2) will not exempt the tax benefit 
where taxpayers purposely enter into an arrangement to enable them to 
take advantage of a tax benefit extended expressly by some proviSion of the 
Act, subsection 24 5(4) can, dependent upon which of the above approaches 
is adopted by the court, be invoked when the court finds that the transac-
tions were structured to attract the tax benefit. Thus in Canada T rustco326 the 
Court concluded the transactions were structured to attract the relevant tax 
benefits, yet the taxpayer was nevertheless able to enjoy the exempting ben-
efits of subsection 245(4).327 
Ultimately, perhaps the so-called failure of subsection 245(4) comes 
down to the fact that it is too amorphous for the judiciary to apply. Thus, as 
suggested by Miller J. in Canada Trusteo, is it "an exercise in the absurd"328 to 
ask a court to consider whether there is an abuse of the Act read as a whole. 
Miller J, continued: 
326. Supra note 107 at paras. 54 and 57. 
327. Ibid. at paras. 54,89. See also Imperial Oil, supra note 16; Canadian PacifiC, supra note 4 at paras. 19, 
34 (the Courts similarly concluded that the subject "weak-currency borroWing" arrangement was 
entered into for tax reasons, but was not a misuse or abuse within s. 245(4». 
328. Canada Trusteo, ibid. at para. 90. 
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What this analysis highlights is the difficulty and risk in determining tax issues 
based on policy. Certainly GAAR invites such an approach, and the Federal 
Court of Appeal has made it clear that the only way to determine if there has 
been a misuse or abuse is to start with the identification of a clear and unam-
biguous policy. No dear and unambiguous pohcy-no application of GAAR. But 
at what level do we seek policy? And, as previously mentioned, do "policy," 
"object and spirit" and "intended use" all mean the same thing? Is there a policy 
behind each particular provision, a policy behind a scheme involving several 
provisions, a policy behind the Act itself? Is the policy fiscal? Is the policy eco-
nomic? Is the policy simply a regurgitation of the rules? Does the identification 
of policy require a deeper delving into the raison d'etre of those rules? How deep 
do we dig? The success or failure of the application ofGAAR left to the Court's 
finding of a dear and unambiguous policy inevitably invites uncertainty. That is 
simply the nature of the GAAR legislation in relying upon such terms as misuse 
and abuse. As many have stated before, this is tax legislation to be applied with 
utmost caution as it directs the Court to ascertain the Government's intention 
and then rely on that ascertainment to override legislation. This is quite a differ-
ent kettle of fish from the accepted approach to statutory interpretation where 
policy might be sought to assist in understanding legislation. Under GAAR, 
policy can displace the legislation.329 
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In contrast, the Canadian courts are not ill equipped to undertake this 
task; "it is Simply asking the courts to perform what is qUintessentially the 
judicial function."33o The interpretation of provisions having regard to the 
object and spirit of the legislation is something with which the Canadian 
courts are familiar. 331 To this end it is suggested that the Canadian subsection 
245(4) is far from unworkable as the approach of the court in OSFC indicates. 
As noted above, in OSFC Rothstein J .A. said the application of subsection 
24 5(4) entails a two stage approach: (i) identifying the relevant policy under-
lying the subject provision(s) or the Act as a whole and (ii) assessing on the 
facts if the avoidance transaction constitutes a misuse or abuse of that poli-
cy.332 As noted above, the Court asserted that at the first stage there is no 
burden of proof borne by either party.333 The task is for the court to identi-
fy the relevant underlying policy. It is nevertheless expected that the 
Minister will refer to any extrinsic materials that may assist the court in iden-
tifying the relevant policy. The taxpayer then has the onus of proving the 
329. Ibid. at para. 91. See generally Arnold & Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1164; Arnold, "Anti-
Avoidance", supra note 4 at 498-511. Arnold suggests that one aspect of the problem lies in the 
reference to "policy" as opposed to "statutory scheme" (at 498). Arnold suggests that Miller J. 
wrongly believes that under s. 245(4) the courts are being asked to determine the relevant under-
lying tax policy as opposed to Simply asking if the subject transaction is contrary to the "object 
and spirit" of the legislation-what Arnold refers to as the "statutory scheme" (at 501-502). To 
this end it is suggested that the GAAR be amended so that it is clear that an avoidance transaction 
involves a misuse or abuse within s. 245(4) if it "contravenes the relevant statutory scheme, not 
the underlying policy" (at 511). 
330. Arnold, "Reflections," supra note 323 at 79. 
331. Compare Arnold and Wilson, "Part 2," supra note 61 at 1168; Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance," supra 
note 4 at 501. 
332. Supra note 16 at para. 67. See also Loyens, supra note 51 at paras. 93,98. 
333. OSFC, ibid. at para. 68. 
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necessary facts to refute the assertion "that the avoidance transaction in 
question results in a misuse or an abuse."334 This does not seem a process of 
folly, as Miller J. suggests. 
VII. Conclusion 
THERE ARE MANY FEATURES of the Canadian GAAR that are to commend it 
when compared to the Australian Part IVA. In particular, from the perspec-
tive of those who oppose tax avoidance, the ability for the GAAR to apply to 
a transaction that is connected to another transaction that has as its primary 
purpose tax avoidance is preferable to the requirement that the scheme as a 
whole be based upon tax avoidance, as under the Australian regime. Equally, 
"tax benefit" is more comprehensively defined under the Canadian GAAR, 
reflecting an appreciation of the various ways that clever constructors of 
arrangements may attract tax benefits. 
However, the divisive approach of the Canadian judiciary to subsec-
tion 245(4) ITA could prove to be its undoing. For the reasons outlined 
above, the approach adopted in relation to, inter alia, subsection 245(4) ITA 
in Canadian Pacific335 is flawed, and it is disturbing that it has been followed in 
recent cases such as Canada Trusteo. It is concerning that despite the most 
clear language of section 245 ITA and, at least the clear policy underlying it, 
some Canadian courts seem intent on rendering it meaningless by relying on 
the pre-GAAR case law which section 245 was intended legislatively to over-
rule. 336 The role the judiciary has taken in this area is particularly relevant 
when one considers Arnold's suggestion that if the courts adopted a purpo-
sive interpretation of the Act, as they should under modern Canadian statu-
tory interpretation, the GAAR would not be necessary. It is peculiar that 
some members of the Canadian courts seem intent on obstructing a clearly 
thought out policy against tax avoidance.337 In Australia's tax history there 
have been suggestions that members of the judiciary have done just the same 
for self-serving reasons, but in Canada there are no such allegations of 
impropriety. So why are the Canadian courts doing this? Do they really think 
their task is insurmountable, as suggested by Miller J. in Canada Trustco?338 
Or is Canadian judicial thought so ingrained with the literal approach 
334,lbid. 
335. Supra note 4 at paras. 32-34. 
336. Compare Arnold, "Reflections", supra note 323 at 80; Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance", supra note 4 at 
510. 
337. Compare Arnold, "Anti-Avoidance," ibid. at 491, 510. Arnold suggests that the GAAR should be 
amended "in a targeted fashion to inform the courts that their interpretation of the existing 
GAAR is not in accordance with the intention of Parliament" (at 510). See ibid. at 510-11, for a 
discussion of the suggested amendments. 
338. Supra note 107 at para. 90. 
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espoused in me v. Duke of Westminster339 that, even though it has been reject-
ed in the United Kingdom,340 the Canadian courts cannot break free, even in 
the face of clear legislative intent?341 If this literal/form approach had only 
been adopted by one 'radical' court, there would be no need for great con-
cern. However, when the 'negative' approach in Canadian Paeifie342 has been 
recently subsequently followed, despite great criticism, in cases such as 
Canada Trusteo,343 it is cause for concern for those who oppose tax avoidance 
in Canada. 
Despite this gloomy conclusion on the Canadian GAAR, as detailed 
above, the Australian legislature could nevertheless learn from the Canadian 
experience. In particular, the Canadian transaction within a series approach 
would catch scenarios where one step is inserted into a transaction to attract 
tax benefits. Moreover, if the judicial inconsistencies to subsection 245(4) 
ITA can be overcome, the subsection's reference to the policy underlying the 
specific provision and the Act as a whole might serve to accord with 
Parliamentary intention in Australia and only subject the Australian GAAR 
to artificial tax avoidance arrangements not intended.to be benefited under 
ITAA or LTAA 1997. 
339. [1936] A.e. 1, 19 T.e. 490. 
340. See Inland Revenue Gnnmissioners v. McGuckian, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 991 at para. 25 (H.L.), [1997] 3 All 
E.R. 817; WT Ramsay Ltd. Yo InlandRevenue Commissioners, [1982] A.C 300, 54 T.C 101 at 316-17 
(H.L.) [cited to A.C.]. 
341. See generally Arnold, "Reflections," supra note 323. 
342. Supra note 4 at paras. 32-34. 
343. Supra note 107 at para. 90. 
